BazermanMoore

86 Chapter 5: Motivational and Emotional Influences on Decision Making
between what they want to do and what they should do (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, &
Damasio, 1997). Notably, however, people who have suffered injuries to emotional regions
of the brain sometimes become more rational decision makers, in the sense that
they are more likely to select options with higher expected value (Shiv, Loewenstein,
Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2005). In sum, the neuroscience evidence suggests that
emotional brain areas impel us to want some things that are not in our long-term interests,
and that more sophisticated brain areas in the prefrontal cortex can override these
desires and select options with higher expected utility.
Whatever the source of our clashing internal preferences, Schelling (1984) points
out that they have substantial economic consequences. Indeed, the multiple-selves
theory helps to explain otherwise perplexing phenomena, including:
The prevalence of large industries supporting both smoking products and treatments
to help people quit smoking.
The simultaneous increase in obesity and the increasing popularity of diet books
and diet fads.
The popularity of drinking and the need for programs like Alcoholics Anonymous.
The popularity of both illegal drugs and clinics to treat drug addiction.
The prevalence of pornography and prostitution in the face of strong social and
legal taboos regarding sexual behavior.
The frequency of procrastination and the popularity of books, programs, and motivational
systems designed to help people stop procrastinating.
Preference Reversals
As we have noted, internal inconsistencies between transient concerns and long-term
self-interest reflect natural tensions between what people want to do and what they
think they should do. In Chapter 4, we used this want/should distinction to explain
preference reversals between separate and joint modes of evaluation. Evidence suggests
that emotional appeal (and the ‘‘want’’ self) is stronger when we evaluate options
one at a time, and that the more reasoned, reflective ‘‘should’’ self will be stronger when
we confront multiple options at the same time and can weigh them against each other.
Standards of comparison clarify differences between alternatives and promote more
rational decision making (Hsee, 1996). By contrast, when considering a single option,
decision makers are often driven by the question, ‘‘Do I want it?’’ In this situation, emotional
and visceral motives are stronger.
Thus, when someone is given the option of a short-term reward (recreational
drugs, skipping work, etc.) that has long-term costs, the ‘‘want’’ self may make an immediate
assessment that the option seems appealing. Yet when that person explicitly compares
the short-term desire against the choice to resist the indulgence, the ‘‘should’’ self
is empowered by the ability to evaluate and compare the relative value of each choice.
It is the ‘‘should’’ self that methodically makes New Year’s resolutions, and the ‘‘want’’
self that breaks them one at a time (Khan & Dhar, 2006, 2007).