BazermanMoore

156 Chapter 9: Making Rational Decisions in Negotiations
firm would minimize its settlement costs. Similarly, if the recruit could convince the
employer that $96,900 was the lowest salary she would accept, we know the employer
would accept this figure, and the recruit would maximize her settlement benefit. Thus,
one of the key skills of negotiation is to determine the other party’s reservation point
and to aim for a resolution that is barely acceptable to the other party. This is a delicate
process. If one or more of the parties were to misjudge the situation, they might rigidly
demand a bargain that is beyond the other party’s reservation point, leading to impasse.
(Such would be the case if, for example, the recruit holds to a demand of $98,000 and
the employer holds to an offer of $92,000—both believing that the other side will ‘‘cave
in.’’) When this occurs, the parties act in ways that prohibit the efficient solution within
the positive bargaining zone. As Ben Franklin (quoted by Raiffa, 1982) observed:
Trades would not take place unless it were advantageous to the parties concerned.
Of course, it is better to strike as good a bargain as one’s bargaining position permits. The
worst outcome is when, by overreaching greed, no bargain is struck, and a trade that could
have been advantageous to both parties does not come off at all.
CREATING VALUE IN NEGOTIATION
The foregoing analysis dealt with negotiation in a situation in which a single issue (salary)
was under dispute. By definition, one-issue negotiations involve the claiming of
value but not the creating of value. Most important negotiations are often more complex,
involving many disputed issues. Through the process of identifying and adding
issues, the parties will have the potential to create value, thereby increasing the amount
of total benefit available.
Value Creation: The Case of the 1978 Camp David Accords
Consider the Camp David talks in 1978 (documented in Pruitt & Rubin, 1985).
Egypt and Israel tried to negotiate the control of the Sinai Peninsula, a situation in which it
appeared that the two sides had directly opposing goals. Egypt wanted the return of the
Sinai in its entirety, while Israel, which had occupied the territory since the 1967 war,
refused to return this land. Efforts at compromise failed. Neither side found the proposal
of splitting the Sinai acceptable.
An initial examination of this conflict suggests that a negative bargaining zone existed
and that a negotiated resolution would not have been possible. That is, if we map
the positions of the parties onto a single scale, the reservation points would not overlap,
and impasse would be inevitable.
Who Gets the Sinai?
100% to Israel Ir(?) Er(?) 100% to Egypt
Ir(?) = estimation of Israel’s reservation point
Er(?) = estimation of Egypt’s reservation point