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60 Chapter 3: Bounded Awareness

Bids (B)

Estimates (E)

B

E

Variables

E = Estimates

B = Bid

Assumptions

1. True value ∝ E

2. True value will be equal for

all bidders

Figure 3.2

Graphic Illustration of the Winner’s Curse

Source: (Bazerman & Samuelson, 1983), ‘‘I Won the Auction But Don’t Want the Prize.’’ Journal of Conflict

Resolution 27, pp. 618–634. Copyright # by Sage Publications, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Sage

Publications, Inc.

provides a graphic depiction of what may have occurred. Curve E shows the distribution

of bidder estimates for the true value of the commodity, and curve B depicts the

distribution of bids. The depiction assumes that (1) the mean of the distribution is

equal to the true value of the commodity—that is, no aggregate under- or overestimation

is expected; and (2) bidders discount their estimates a fixed amount in making bids,

which explains the leftward shift of the bid distribution. The figure suggests that a winning

bid—that is, one from the right tail of the distribution—is likely to exceed the

actual value of the commodity. The highest bidder is likely to have been one of the

highest estimators, and unless they had reason to believe that they had better information

than the other bidders, overpayment is likely. In fact, our research found that the

winning bidder in auctions of highly uncertain commodities with a large number of

bidders commonly pays more than the commodity is worth.

Why does the winning bidder fall prey to the winner’s curse? Because of the information

that is excluded from his or her thought processes—in other words, because of

bounded awareness. If a particular bidder or bidding group assumes that their bid will

win the auction, their assumption should tell them that they are likely to have overestimated

the value of the commodity in comparison to other bidders. Based on this reasoning,

bidders on highly uncertain commodities who are competing against a large

number of other bidders should adjust their estimates of the true value of the commodity

downward and lower their bids accordingly. Thus, if they do win, they are less likely

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