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These findings are consistent with the affect heuristic introduced in Chapter 1,
with the work on joint versus separate preference reversals introduced in Chapter 4,
and with the want/should distinction developed in Chapter 5. When we assess one option
at a time, social comparisons serve as the reference points we use to assess our
outcomes. But when multiple options exist, it becomes easier to compare across our
multiple options and disregard the less useful comparison to others.
Perverse Consequences of Equality Norms
The responder’s expectations in an ultimatum game are partially affected by a norm of
equality. In the ultimatum game, expectations of fairness lead to the rejection of economically
desirable offers, but it is also possible that the same norms of equality can
cause us to accept ‘‘fair’’ situations too prematurely. Messick (1991) identifies many
contexts in which individuals expect an even split, even when a rational analysis would
not support such a split. The ease with which individuals accept an equal allocation of
pleasure and pain probably accounts, in large measure, for the common use of the compromise
solution in negotiations. Consider the following situation:
You visit a car dealer and go on a test drive. You return to the salesperson’s cubicle in the
showroom. The car has a list price of $18,000. After a short discussion, you offer $15,500.
The salesperson counters with $17,600, you counter with $16,000, he counters with
$17,200, you counter with $16,400, and he reduces his price to $16,800. You act as if you
will not make another concession and threaten to visit another dealership. The salesperson
then says earnestly, ‘‘You look like a nice person, and I can see that you really like the car.
My main concern is that you get the car that you want. I assume that you are a reasonable
person, and I want to be reasonable. How about if we split the difference—$16,600?’’
Many of us would quickly accept the salesman’s offer. After all, a 50–50 split
sounds fair. Yet, careful consideration reveals that this 50–50 split, like most 50–50
splits, is quite arbitrary. The final two numbers on the table could have been $16,000
and $16,400, and the 50–50 split would have sounded just as fair, but the resulting price
would have been $16,200, or $400 less. The fairness of a 50–50 split depends on the
comparative fairness of the two numbers used as anchors for the split. A rational decision
maker must be aware of the influence of a seemingly fair 50–50 split and realize
that other 50–50 alternatives are easy to generate. Just because an offer can be considered
fair does not mean that it is optimal. Other equally fair outcomes may exist that
would be better for you.
Again, we see that fairness concerns do influence decisions and that ignoring
others’ fairness concerns can be costly. People are entitled to their own assessments of
fairness. However, we must all realize that others may have very different standards
about what is fair.
Why Do Fairness Judgments Matter?
Perceptions of Fairness 121
One reason why we should care whether others think our actions are fair is that they
will punish us for behaving unfairly. People engage in such punishment even when