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The Gortons and Slades - Washington Secretary of State

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360 sLAde goRton: A hALf centuRy in poLitics<br />

when the terrorists have created more problems for their co-religionists<br />

than they do for us. We can contribute to that struggle, but it has to be<br />

won internally, <strong>and</strong> the Muslim world’s decline will never be reversed or<br />

even arrested as long as so much <strong>of</strong> Islam discriminates against the 50<br />

percent <strong>of</strong> its population that is female. Education is a huge part <strong>of</strong> the<br />

war against terrorism.”<br />

<strong>of</strong> ALL the RecoMMendAtions made by the 9/11 Commission, none was<br />

more imperative than the admonition to make structural changes in intelligence<br />

gathering <strong>and</strong> sharing. To paraphrase the Peter Principle, in a<br />

huge government hierarchy every agency tends to protect its turf at the<br />

risk <strong>of</strong> incompetence.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission concluded that the job <strong>of</strong> Director <strong>of</strong> Central Intelligence<br />

should be scrapped. Downgraded was another way to put it. (George<br />

Tenet announced his resignation before the final report was released.)<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission believed it was impractical <strong>and</strong> counterproductive for<br />

the CIA chief to do double duty. He should be strictly an agency manager,<br />

reporting to a new supreme spymaster. <strong>The</strong> cabinet-level Director<br />

<strong>of</strong> National Intelligence would also oversee America’s other intelligencegathering<br />

agencies, including the FBI’s National Security Branch, Homel<strong>and</strong><br />

Security’s threat analysts, the National Security Agency <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Defense Intelligence Agency.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission also called for a new National Counterterrorism<br />

Center to integrate information on terrorist threats. It was crucial for the<br />

new director to have real power, including budget <strong>and</strong> personnel authority.<br />

Otherwise, the outcome would be just another layer <strong>of</strong> bureaucracy.<br />

<strong>The</strong> turf wars would continue.<br />

it hAd Been A Long hot suMMeR. Literally <strong>and</strong> figuratively. With both<br />

national conventions imminent, the political atmosphere was supercharged<br />

as the commission’s final report was released on July 22, 2004.<br />

Massachusetts Senator John Kerry, Bush’s challenger, had been warning<br />

that the White House would try to spin the report to blame Democrats for<br />

the nation’s intelligence snafus. <strong>The</strong> White House returned fire with its<br />

own flurry <strong>of</strong> e-mails to reporters <strong>and</strong> editorial writers. 9<br />

Flanked by Rumsfeld, Ashcr<strong>of</strong>t <strong>and</strong> other administration notables,<br />

Bush gave the 9/11 report the full Rose Garden photo-op treatment. By<br />

executive order, he created the counterterrorism center, but balked at cabinet-level<br />

status for the new Director <strong>of</strong> National Intelligence. <strong>The</strong> director<br />

would have “significant input” but not the final say. Bush was also

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