The Gortons and Slades - Washington Secretary of State

362 sLAde goRton: A hALf centuRy in poLitics
members who spoke out about the opponents. “There is a clear attempt
afoot to marginalize the findings and recommendations of the commission,”
she wrote in a guest editorial. “I was horrified to hear one former
FBI agent call the commission ‘a traveling circus’ in a television interview.
. . . It is completely irresponsible to demean this essential and important
work. . . .Congress must force federal agencies to make changes.” 13
John Warner, the Virginia Republican who headed the Senate Armed
Services Committee, was a staunch defender of the Pentagon’s intelligence
prerogatives. He worried that the commission was out to reduce the
secretary of defense to a “payroll clerk.” Lieberman, McCain and Senator
Susan Collins of Maine warned that terrorism was a real and present
danger. Al-Qaida doubtless was busy planning its next attack and enjoying
the woolgathering. It was time to get the lead out. “Nothing else we
do is more important,” Lieberman said. 14
By the third anniversary of 9/11, Bush was offering concessions; ready
to give the Director of National Intelligence “full budgetary authority”
over most of the Intelligence Community yet still hedging his bets on
whether the new spymaster should control all military intelligence-
gathering. 15
Bush defeAted KeRRy on the strength of Ohio’s 20 electoral votes. Republicans
solidified control of Congress, and the 9/11 Commission was
confident it had the popular vote. Still, it took another month of jawboning—especially
among reluctant Republicans in the House—to pass the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. It cleared the House
on December 7; the Senate a day later, and was quickly signed into law by
Bush. Gorton and the other nine commissioners looked on. It was a day
of somber satisfaction and optimism, Gorton recalls. A year later, however,
as its final act, the commission issued a report card rating the response
to its recommendations: Five F’s, 12 D’s, nine C’s, 11 B’s, two “incompletes”
and one A minus (for “significant strides” against terrorist
financing, although the State Department and Treasury were still engaged
in “unhelpful turf battles”). Uncle Sam couldn’t even make it to
junior college with a grade-point average of 1.76. The F’s included airline
passenger prescreening. Bag and cargo screening got a D. 16
In particular, little progress had been made on information sharing.
The good news was that the harsh report card opened a lot of eyes in
Congress—part of the commission’s strategy. Gorton was hopeful that
the new Counterterrorism Center would be the intelligence conduit
America needs to help protect itself from such cunning and resourceful