Open%20borders%20The%20case%20against%20immigration%20controls%20-%20Teresa%20Hayter

48 Open Borders
tended to produce more arguments against controls than for them. It found
no evidence for allegations that immigrants were particularly prone to either
crime or disease. Housing was recognised to be a problem, but the working
party argued that improving it would provide too much of an inducement
for more immigrants to come. It found that unemployment among black and
Asian immigrants was not rising; during the years 1959 to 1961, in spite of
large increases in the numbers coming to Britain, unemployment never rose
above 5 per cent; therefore the argument that immigrants were an excessive
burden on national assistance was not tenable. The Treasury, asked to give
an opinion on whether or not Asian and black immigration benefited the
economy, gave the clear advice that on economic grounds there was no justification
for introducing immigration controls; most immigrants found
employment without creating unemployment for the natives and, in
particular by easing labour bottlenecks, they contributed to the productive
capacity of the economy as a whole. In its eventual recommendations for
controls, the working party’s report (quoted by Spencer in British Immigration
Policy) had to fall back on ‘the dangers of social tension inherent in the
existence of large unassimilated coloured communities’. It recognised that
‘the advocacy of exclusion of stocks deemed to be inferior is presentationally
impossible’. It also recognised that the ‘curtailment of immigration ostensibly
on employment grounds would not be easy to justify’. It nevertheless
proposed a labour voucher system in the following terms:
While it would apply equally to all parts of the Commonwealth, without distinction
on grounds of race and colour, in practice it would interfere to the minimum extent
with the entry of persons from the ‘old’ Commonwealth countries. ... The control over
the entry of the unskilled would be of the most flexible character. Decisions reached
in London could at any time increase or decrease the flow by the simple process of
sending out more or fewer permits. While any scheme which effectively limits free
entry is bound to run into political criticism, the flexibility of operation of this scheme
should keep such criticism down to a minimum.
None of this was said publicly or officially. Throughout the debate on the bill
ministers continued to deny that the intention of the legislation was to keep
out immigrants from Asia and the Caribbean.
The recession beginning in the 1960s and the growth of unemployment
would undoubtedly, in the absence of controls, have caused a large drop in
immigration to Britain by young people in search of work. But during the
two years up to the passing of the act, it had become widely known that
restrictions were likely to be introduced. This meant that people who might
not otherwise have planned to come immediately to Britain did so. In
addition, before controls were introduced, people came often with the
intention that their stay would be temporary. They now had to contemplate
more permanent settlement, and to try to bring in their families. Although
the Caribbean migrants included families and single women workers,
migrants from the Indian subcontinent initially came to Britain over-