Open%20borders%20The%20case%20against%20immigration%20controls%20-%20Teresa%20Hayter
Open%20borders%20The%20case%20against%20immigration%20controls%20-%20Teresa%20Hayter
Open%20borders%20The%20case%20against%20immigration%20controls%20-%20Teresa%20Hayter
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Border Controls 61<br />
Any Colombian, Russian or Nigerian who had legally entered the EU through<br />
Rome, Vienna or Paris would be free to waltz into Britain with no checks on them. ...<br />
Thus, the Portuguese consulate in Mozambique, or the German consulate in<br />
Colombia, by issuing a visa, could determine who ultimately entered Britain. ...<br />
This was a bombshell. ...<br />
We had never envisaged that freedom of movement within the European Union<br />
meant that we would be obliged to admit non-EU citizens without any right to control<br />
their numbers.<br />
The British, of course, flattered themselves if they thought that people who<br />
had managed to enter Germany or Portugal would then wish to ‘waltz’ into<br />
Britain in any numbers.<br />
The Amsterdam Treaty, negotiated in 1998, stated that within a five-year<br />
period there should be agreement on measures with respect to external<br />
borders to allow free movement of persons in line with article 7a of the<br />
Maastricht Treaty; measures to implement an ‘absence of any controls on<br />
persons, be they citizens of the Union or nationals of third countries, when<br />
crossing internal borders’; and measures to harmonise the treatment of<br />
refugees. In an initial three-year period decisions were to be made by the<br />
Council of Ministers, acting unanimously; subsequently decisions could be<br />
by qualified majority. The Schengen agreements were absorbed into the<br />
Maastricht Treaty and became law, with a protocol enabling Britain to opt<br />
in to its provisions. In March 1999 the British Home Secretary Jack Straw<br />
announced in Brussels that Britain now wished to opt in to aspects of the<br />
Schengen Convention which related to police and judicial cooperation and<br />
information-gathering, such as the strengthening of Europol, and to<br />
participate in the Schengen information system (SIS), set up to provide a<br />
computer database on ‘criminals, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants’.<br />
Europol is a European police organisation originally set up under the<br />
Maastricht Treaty as the ‘European Drugs Unit’, which has recently become<br />
involved in the hunting and detention of migrants, including asylum seekers.<br />
The SIS is a massive system, which has been condemned by both Amnesty<br />
International and the UNHCR, designed to increase internal controls on<br />
migration; it has more than 30,000 terminals and contains large amounts<br />
of personal information, including fingerprints. Almost 90 per cent of those<br />
registered on the SIS are ‘unwanted immigrants’, including many asylum<br />
seekers. The British were also enthusiastic promoters of such control<br />
measures at the special EU justice and home affairs summit at Tampere in<br />
Finland in October 1999. Straw was said to hope that agreement on asylum<br />
criteria at Tampere and afterwards might help to curb what he considered to<br />
be the excessive liberalism of British judges. The likelihood was that the<br />
search for common procedures and criteria would lead to agreement on the<br />
lowest common denominator.<br />
The curbing of migration and asylum seeking, and in particular of what<br />
is called in the jargon the ‘trafficking’ of migrants and refugees, has become<br />
an obsession with the authorities of European states. According to John