Open%20borders%20The%20case%20against%20immigration%20controls%20-%20Teresa%20Hayter
Open%20borders%20The%20case%20against%20immigration%20controls%20-%20Teresa%20Hayter
Open%20borders%20The%20case%20against%20immigration%20controls%20-%20Teresa%20Hayter
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Border Controls 49<br />
whelmingly as young single men. Their intention was to work and save or<br />
remit their wages for a limited period and then return to their countries,<br />
perhaps to be replaced by their sons or younger brothers. The introduction<br />
of controls put paid to this rotatory system. After the act the composition of<br />
migrants changed from men of working age to mainly women, children and<br />
older people, since family reunion was in theory allowed. By 1967 over 90<br />
per cent of all Commonwealth immigrants were dependants. Immigration<br />
of Asian and black people to settle in Britain continued at the rate of<br />
30,000–50,000 per year up to the early 1990s, a reduction only in relation<br />
to the ‘bulge’ figures of 1960–62, which controls had done much to create<br />
(see Table 1.2 on p. 19). According to Nicholas Deakin’s study Colour,<br />
Citizenship and British Society:<br />
In 1961 net inward migration from India increased fourfold and from Pakistan tenfold<br />
over the previous year. Before 1961 the migration from India and Pakistan fluctuated<br />
at a fairly low level. As late as 1959 the net inward flow from both countries was only<br />
3,800. ... well over half the Indians and approximately three-quarters of the Pakistanis<br />
who arrived in Britain before control arrived in the 18-month period January 1961<br />
to June 1962.<br />
The fear of controls also caused a rise in the arrival of Caribbean people,<br />
though it was less marked. Figure 1 in Colour, Citizenship and British Society,<br />
based on a study by Ceri Peach, shows that arrivals from the Caribbean<br />
followed almost precisely the rise and fall in job vacancies, but, as Deakin<br />
notes, ‘The sharp rise in the rate of West Indian migration in 1961 and 1962<br />
was for the first time against the economic indicators.’ Irish immigration,<br />
uncontrolled by the act, continued to correspond to job opportunities.<br />
The Tories made much of the fact that, following the act, there were<br />
300,000 applications for unskilled labour vouchers. Their attempts to argue<br />
that, if it had not been for the act, 300,000 would have come in were initially<br />
contradicted by their own Home Secretary, Henry Brooke, who said in the<br />
House of Commons in November 1963:<br />
There are over a quarter of a million applications for vouchers which have not yet<br />
been granted. Neither I nor anyone else would seek to argue that if control were lifted<br />
a quarter of a million people would immediately arrive in this country.<br />
In the first 18 months after the act was passed, a total of 66,000 vouchers<br />
were issued for all categories; only 35,000 were used. Only 21 per cent of<br />
the vouchers granted to Indians and Pakistanis were used. Part of the<br />
explanation for the large number of applications was, again, as an insurance<br />
policy against the possible loss of opportunities in the future.<br />
During the 1964 general election campaign, some Tories, especially in<br />
the Midlands, adopted openly racist tactics. The Tory candidate for Perry<br />
Barr in Birmingham, Dr Wyndham Davies, put out an eve of poll leaflet<br />
which said: ‘300,000 immigrants: This could happen if you Vote Labour’.<br />
The Tory candidate Peter Griffiths ran a viciously racist campaign in a ‘safe’