Dasein - Monoskop

HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOIjOGY AND LANGU AGE AS CALCULUS 89
But as a method, and in respect of the set propositions which
are to find their place in the fundamental work on phenomenology
still to be brought out, we apply to ourselves the rule of
phenomenological reduction which bears on our own empirical
existence as well as on that of other beings, forbidding us to
introduce a proposition which contains, implicitly or explicitly,
such references to natural positings [Scteunjcn]. 310
In the Crisis Husserl holds that in moving to the transcendental
stance we form a "new sort of language (new even if I use ordinary
language, as is unavoidable, though its meanings are also unavoidably
transformed)". 311 This remark—that lies in line with Husserl's
suggestions for 'noema quotation' to which we shall turn below—
implies that transcendental language results from a re-interpretation
of language over the domain of phenomena.
We can strengthen this interpretation by drawing on Husserl's
annotations to Fink's "Draft for a VI. Cartesian Meditation" and
on some of HusserFs unpublished manuscripts. Fink himself writes
in a preliminary sketch for the preface to his study that Husserl
"regards the difficulties concerning transcendental predication to
be exaggerated". 312 In his annotations, Husserl concedes that "the
phenomenology of phenomenological language is a problem of phenomenology
in its own right ([a problem) that carries with it its
iteration)". 313 But he regards "the miracle of transforming" natural
into transcendental language, that is, the re-interpretation of
language as a whole, to be a "really solvable problem". 314 Fink's
argument, that language after the reduction still refers to worldly
objects, can convince only those philosophers "that do not really interpret
phenomenologically" 315 , that is, for those critics that do not
perform the "transformation of the natural meaning". 316 In two unpublished
manuscripts of the early thirties Husserl- perhaps in answer
to Fink goes into somewhat greater detail. Under the heading
"The Original Language of the Radical Phenomenologist" he writes
that in the transcendental stance natural language "is egologically reduced,
and words and sentences become mere egological symbols that
receive their meaning content from the freely acting Ego". Husserl
calls this "a basic fact that is presupposed by phenomenology", and
goes on to say: