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NOTES TO PART 111 295 ana University Press, Bloomington, 1984, (hereafter Foundations). Sl Grundprobleme, p. 85; Basic Problems, p. 61. 82 Grundprobleme, p. 88; Basic Problems, p. 63. 83 Grundprobleme, p. 90; Basic Problems, p. 64. 84 Grundprobleme, p. 90; Basic Problems, p. 64. 85 Grundprobleme, p. 93; Basic Problems, p. 66. 86 Zeit, p. 63; Time, p. 46. Especially in recent Germain philosophy, Heidegger's criticism of the subject vs. object distinction has met with considerable systematic interest. See Ernst Tugendhat, Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1979; Martin Bartels, Selbstbewußtsein und Unbewußtes, de Gruyter, Berlin, 1976, pp. 132-188. Cf. Frederick A. Olafson, Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind, Yale University Press, New Haven k London, 1987. 87 M. Heidegger, Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizitat). Vorlesung Sommersemester 19S3, edited by Kate Bröcker-Oltmanns, Gesamtausgabe Vol. 63, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1958, (hereafter Ontologie), p 82. 88 Ontologie, p. 81. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Anfangsgrunde, p. 167; Foundations, p. 133. 92 Anfangsgründe, p. 170; Foundations, p. 135. Anfangsgründe, p. 214; Foundations, p. 167. **Zeit, p. 254; Time. p. 187. The primacy of implicit identification (or awareness) of something over explicit identification (or cognition) is also central in Johannes Daubert's criticism of Husserl. See Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, "Against Idealism: Johannes Daubert vs. Husserl's Ideas I", Review of Metaphysics, vol. 38 (1985), pp. 763-793, here p. 784. 95 Anfangsgründe, p. 169; Foundations, p. 134, with translation changed. Without mentioning Husserl's name, Heidegger argued already in 1919 (Weltanschauungsproblem, p. 89) that asking how something is "given" means changing the original experience into a theoretical one. 98 Grundprobleme, p. 225; Basic Problems, p. 158. 97 Heidegger in his "Gutachten über die Habilitationsschrift des Herrn Dr. Karl Lowith", Marburg, 16.2.1928, p. 2: "Das Ich-Du-Verhältnis läfit sich daher auch nicht als eine personifizierte Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung fassen." **Zeit, p. 334; Time, pp. 242-243, with translation changed. 99 Aristoteles, p. 80. 100 SZ, p. 68; BT, p. 97.
296 NOTES TO PART III X0l SZ, p. 73; BT, p. 103. l02 Ibid. l03 For extensive discussion on this topic, see Gerold Pr&uss, Erkennen und Handeln in Heideggers "Sein und Zeit", Alber, Freiburg—München, 1977. 104Zett, p. 252; Time, p. 186. 105 /6trf., with translation changed. 106 Zeit, p. 287, Time, pp. 209-210, with translation changed. 107A nfangsgrunde, p. 232; Foundations, p. 180. Grundprobleme, p. 242; Basic Problems, p. 170. 109 See note 102. 110 Anfangsgrunde, p. 238; Foundations, p. 185. IU SZ, p. 135; BT, p. 174. m SZ,p. 386; BT, p. 438. 113 Grundprobleme, p. 242; Basic Problems, p. 170. 1M "Vom Wesen des Grundes", in Wegmarken, pp. 21-71, here pp. 54-55. English translation by Terrence Malick, The Essence of Reasons, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1969, p. 89. n *SZ, pp. 148-153; BT, pp. 188-195. n *SZ, p. 153; BT, p. 194. 117 In "Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion" (1920/21), Heidegger distinguishes between Umwelt, Mitwelt, Selbstwelt, and furthermore calls art and science "genuine life-worlds" (^envine Lebenswelten). (2.11.1920). (Nachschrift Recker) The same distinction is made in "Augustinus und der Neupl&tonismus" (Vorlesung, Freiburg 1921). (Nachschrift Becker.) 118 Zeit, p. 333; Time, p. 242. U9 "Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion", "'Welt ist etwas, worin man leben kann (in einem Objekt kann man nicht leben)." (2.11.1920) In order to do justice to Husserl, it must be mentioned here that in Crisis §37 he stresses that the world is not an object. Even though Heidegger's argument thus does not immediately apply to Husserl, it does seem to apply to Lewis, however. Calvin Normore, independently of Heidegger, has suggested to me (in pers. comm.) that Lewis's concrete worlds cannot but be thought of as concrete objects. However, to conceive of worlds as concrete objects amounts to using the notion of 'object' in a highly unusual and obscure way. It certainly is part of our usual notion of concrete objects that we can point to them. But in the case of a world, e.g., our world, we can only "wave our arms about in a vague way"; A.N. Prior and Kit Fine, Worlds, Times and Selves, University of Massachusetts Press, Armherst,
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MARTIN KUSCH LANGUAGE AS CALCULUS V
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SYNTHESE LIBRARY STUDIES IN EPISTEM
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ISBN 0-7923-0333-4 Published by Klu
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vi TABLE OF CONTENTS 5. Summary of
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PREFACE I first became interested i
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PREFACE xi Publishers for her frien
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2 PART II directly. For instance, w
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4 PART II sality of language cannot
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6 PART II cording to this classical
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8 PART II 3. SOME QUALIFICATIONS AN
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10 PART II of this view, Heidegger
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12 PART II Investigations. 5 The se
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14 PART II even posed the question
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16 PART II fact is important from t
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18 PART II different numbers differ
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20 PART II real (existing in the ob
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22 PART II speaks of number names a
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24 PART II bilitationsschrift On th
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26 PART II Also in the Philosophy o
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28 PART II as an easy prey to psych
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30 PART II review, where Husserl st
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32 PART II the signs within the cal
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34 PART II "something novel and of
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36 PART II and will therefore not b
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38 PART II lowing passage: We will
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40 PART II truth. In order to appre
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42 PART II underlies interpretation
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44 PART II the debate between Frege
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46 PART II Husserl makes clear that
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48 PART II Especially since Dagfinn
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50 PART II tion more than a wild gu
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52 PART II The charge of a hidden p
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54 PART II chological states and di
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56 PART II meant to clarify this is
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58 PART II because individual acts
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60 PART II development of semantica
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62 PART II syntartically possible.
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64 PART II to investigations five a
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66 PART II criticism of the corresp
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68 PART II fulfillment of a meaning
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70 PART II seem independent of perc
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72 PART II it is noteworthy that Hu
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74 PART II An act of perception gra
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76 PART II What we have dealt with
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78 PART II development is Husserl's
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80 PART II to raise all sciences, a
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82 PART II which have—due to the
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84 PART II all other ontological co
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86 PART II There remains the pure s
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88 PART II have by their nature a w
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90 PART II I reduce myself to the t
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92 PART II be incompatible with res
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94 PART II cal Investigations, but
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96 PART II through which the respec
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98 PART II is not within the world
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100 PART II of his properties are e
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102 PART II (Gegenständlichkeit),
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104 PART II of perceptive acts that
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106 PART II new Sinn ... Furthermor
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108 PART II A second point that can
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110 PART II if Husserl were to clai
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112 PART II ego. We know already, h
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114 PART III that transcendentai ph
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116 PART III This turns out to be a
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118 PART III linguistic community".
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120 PART III primitive one, another
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122 PART III stresses the role of c
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124 PART III their pure form, abstr
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126 PART III individuals. Despite t
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128 PART III manifolds are construc
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130 PART III "active synthesis", we
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132 PART III commitments within dif
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134 PART III (C-8) Formalism can be
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136 PART III period of Being and Ti
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138 PART III a mind-independent rea
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140 PART III however, is that Heide
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142 PART III ger first argues that
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144 PART III ger interprets Scotus'
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146 PART III to treat this chapter
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148 PART M 3. THE WORLD AS A "CLOSE
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150 PART III spectively, the role o
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152 PART III more freely in them. F
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154 PART III absence of special add
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156 PART III this view, even though
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158 PART III Heidegger believes, ho
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160 PART III Heidegger characterize
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162 PART III In other words, the pr
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164 PART III First, note that Heide
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166 PART III tation is neatly confi
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168 PART M That Heidegger was sensi
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170 PART III Every practical object
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172 PART III ation of HusserFs phen
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174 PART III the importance of this
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176 PART III eted", the transcenden
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178 PART III whatever. Here we have
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180 PART III essential pertinence t
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182 PART III Are its axioms empty?
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184 PART III own earlier defense of
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186 PART III been interpreted, set
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188 PART III more fundamental" 208
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190 PART III ("To Dasein's state of
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192 PART III weapon against psychol
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194 PART III in the Dasein-centered
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196 PART III and Russell among othe
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198 PART III to think wrongly of wo
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200 PART III speaks of the former a
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202 PART III 4.2. Language and Bein
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204 PART III ... tautology is the o
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206 PART III World, illumination an
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208 PART M domain [Zeit-Spiel-Raum]
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210 PART III almost poetic expressi
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212 PART III Heidegger sees a link
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214 PART III 4.3. Language, Art, an
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216 PART III quotation alludes to t
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218 PART M this attribution is easi
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220 PART III anything about them, w
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222 PART III and meaning, on the ot
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224 PART III from our vantage point
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226 PART III project and nature to
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228 PART III (UM-7) Truth as corres
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230 PART III In this epilogue, I sh
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232 PARTIV dialogue with classical
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234 PART III ment of a "prejudice a
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236 PART III concerned with the not
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238 PART III [Husscrrs] transcenden
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240 PART III general to Heidegger's
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242 PART III Subsequently, I shall
Page 255 and 256: 244 PARTIV its expressive power. 'O
Page 257 and 258: 246 PART III Gadamer argues that di
Page 259 and 260: 248 PART III thus by the view of th
Page 261 and 262: 250 PART III terms. The former idea
Page 263 and 264: 252 PART III symbol, while, at the
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Page 267 and 268: 256 PART III nate this point: The w
Page 269 and 270: 258 PART III Husserl's notion of ad
Page 271 and 272: NOTES TO PART III *0n Husserl's lif
Page 273 and 274: 262 NOTES TO PART III 16 See "Grund
Page 275 and 276: 264 NOTES TO PART III 64 See note 9
Page 277 and 278: 266 NOTES TO PART III Vorlesungen
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Page 285 and 286: 274 NOTES TO PART III Evanston, 197
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Page 289 and 290: 278 NOTES TO PART III Wittgenstein,
Page 291 and 292: 280 NOTES TO PART III 332 See note
Page 293 and 294: 282 NOTES TO PART III 37l The Engli
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Page 297 and 298: 286 NOTES TO PART III dem Nachlass.
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Page 313 and 314: 302 NOTES TO PART EI 221 SZ, p. 221
Page 315 and 316: 304 NOTES TO PART EI 270 Ibid., p.
Page 317 and 318: 306 NOTES TO PART EI create freely
Page 319 and 320: 308 NOTES TO PART EI 326 Ibid.} p.
Page 321 and 322: NOTES TO PART IV 1 Jean-Paul Sartre
Page 323 and 324: 312 NOTES TO PART EI 37 WM, p. 234;
Page 325 and 326: 314 NOTES TO PART EI 88 WM, p. 390;
Page 327 and 328: 316 BIBLIOGRAPHY assistance of Raym
Page 329 and 330: 318 BIBLIOGRAPHY 3.2. Volumes of th
Page 331 and 332: 320 BIBLIOGRAPHY Kant und das Probl
Page 333 and 334: 322 BIBLIOGRAPHY Time, Basil Blackw
Page 335 and 336: 324 BIBLIOGRAPHY nus Nijhoff, The H
Page 337 and 338: 326 BIBLIOGRAPHY Aguirre, Antonio,
Page 339 and 340: 328 BIBLIOGRAPHY 212. Carr, David,
Page 341 and 342: 330 BIBLIOGRAPHY Constitution of th
Page 343 and 344: 332 BIBLIOGRAPHY Die Exposition der
Page 345 and 346: 334 BIBLIOGRAPHY Kockelmans, Joseph
Page 347 and 348: 336 BIBLIOGRAPHY Mohanty, J.N., "In
Page 349 and 350: 338 BIBLIOGRAPHY Richardson, Willia
Page 351 and 352: 340 BIBLIOGRAPHY Spiegelberg, Herbe
Page 353 and 354: 342 BIBLIOGRAPHY Yung-Han, Kim, Hus
Page 355 and 356: 344 INDEX OF NAMES Bolzano, B. 14,
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346 INDEX OF NAMES Gudopp, W.-D. 29
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348 INDEX OF NAMES Kripke, S. 98, 2
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350 INDEX OF NAMES Plantinga, A. 98
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352 INDEX OF NAMES Weiss, P. 267-26
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354 INDEX OF SUBJECTS absolute 175;
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356 INDEX OF SUBJECTS horizon 93, 1
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358 INDEX OF SUBJECTS mereology 59.
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360 INDEX OF SUBJECTS relativism 1,
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362 INDEX OF SUBJECTS cultural 118,
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SYNTHESE LIBRARY STUDIES IN I;PISTI
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