Dasein - Monoskop

HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOIJOGY AND LANGU AGE AS CALCULUS 111
Kantian assumption according to which God qua intellectus archetypus
and creator has immediate access to Dinge an sich, whereas we
as human beings have only knowledge of phenomena since our knowledge
is based on sense perception. 416 Husserl does not directly argue
against this position by presenting a model as to how and why we
have access to Dingc an sich. Instead, he claims that if the assumption
of unknowable things is based on our receptivity in perception,
then not even God can grasp them: God too is dependent on receptivity.
Husserl maintains that for all intellects the same structural
essential rules are binding as to how knowledge is obtained, and as
to what kinds of knowledge there are. For instance, the difference
between empirical and non-empirical truths is as valid for God as it
is valid for us. 417 Furthermore, even though God creates things and
worlds, these things and worlds are—once created—"facts" 418 for
God, too: "Even from an absolute perspective, objects as individual
objects can be posited only on the basis of an experience as receptivity
. .." 419 Husserl concludes that if we argue with Kant that it is
our receptivity which hinders us to reach Dinge an sich, then, since
knowledge of individual things is necessarily bound to receptivity,
• • •
... even God who equally can, in knowledge and thought, posit
individual things only on the basis of affections—would have to
posit behind his things new things. And when God comes-toknow
these new things, he will have to posit again new Dinge
an sich and so on ad infinitum. 420
In Ideas I Husserl does not use this reductio ad absurdum argument.
Instead he makes use of the correlation between worlds
and transcendental egos. His central premiss is that to be a thing,
cause or state of affairs is to be an object of perception or knowledge
for some ego, is to be an object with respect to which some (possible)
transcendental ego would make a true existential statement
("A possible ego thus belongs to the possibility of truth, i.e., of a
true being ..." 421 ) On this basis Husserl asks what it would mean
if there were something which is inaccessible to us. His answer is
not surprising: it would mean that this something is a part of some
world correlated with another—and not one's own—transcendental