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HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOIjOGY AND LANGU AGE AS CALCULUS 123
Husserlian pronouncements on the relation between language and
life-world, on the one hand, and on life-worlds, their common essence,
and their understanding 'from outside', on the other hand, allow us
to claim that Husserlian phenomenology opposes linguistic relativism
even in its final stage. Since a life-world is essentially the world of a
linguistic community (see above p. 118), since all life-worlds share in
a common essence (p. 120), and since any one life-world is accessible
to an interpreter from another life-world, it follows that no linguistic
community lives within an incommensurable, untranslatable conceptual
scheme.
4.6. Logic and Transcendental Phenomenology
In the two chapters on Husserl's pre-transcendental philosophy we
saw how his fundamental premiss concerning semantics, that is, the
conception of logic/language as calculus, emerged in the context of
logical and mathematical investigations. In the present chapter we
have studied how Husserl generalizes and applies this conception far
beyond its original domain. Now it is time to review the effects which
the adoption of the transcendental stand has for Husserl's views concerning
logic and mathematics. These views can be extracted fairly
clearly from his Formal and Transcendental Logic 480 as well as from
Experience and Judgment 481 , the latter work having been compiled
and edited posthumously by Ludwig Landgrebe. In general, one can
say that the central pillars of Husserl's conception of logic and mathematics
as contained in the Logical Investigations are not affected by
his transcendental turn. However, what is new in the later works is
that Husserl now attempts to draw a clear line between logical syntax
and semantics, formulates his position on formalism in mathematics
more clearly, and attempts a phenomenological critique of logical
truths and evidences.
In order to appreciate Husserl's work concerning the syntaxsemantics
distinction, a brief summary of his ideas on "the structures
and the sphere of objective formal logic" 482 is called for. In Formal
and Transcendental Logic Husserl distinguishes between three
strata within formal logic. The lowest level corresponds to what the
Logical Investigations called " theory of the pure forms of meanings
(or grammar of pure logic)" 4 * 3 . It is concerned with judgments in