Dasein - Monoskop

HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOIjOGY AND LANGU AGE AS CALCULUS 71
the world, then this makes no sense; there is no intelligible way of
saying that these ontologically different entities coincide. If, in order
to avoid this horn of the dilemma, we say that the identity really
holds between two presentations, then, Frege claims, we run head-on
against the other horn: if two presentations are identical, then they
are one presentation, and what was supposed to be a two-placed
relation ends up being a predicate of merely one presentation.
Husserl most certainly avoids the first horn of the Fregean
dilemma, since he does not hold that the correspondence holds between
presentation (meaning-intention) and real thing. The real
thing enters into the relation as a percept, as the objective correlate
of the perceptual act of meaning-fulfillment. Thus it seems that
Husserl rather gets caught by the second horn. Yet it is not difficult
to see how the complexity of his account also provides him
with plenty of room to stay clear of this trap. Husserl holds that
meaning-fulfillment is best regarded as a process that starts from an
empty intention and only ends in a total fulfillment. This allows a
distinction between the two presentations despite the fact that they
will ultimately be identified. We also saw that Husserl assumes that
we can always perceive truth as identity and difference: we can perceive
the meaning and the fulfillment as distinct and as identical, we
can perceive them as entering into identity. (It is Frege's opposition
to metalanguage that precludes this solution for him.)
While the first two questions could be dealt with rather briefly,
the remaining one will demand more extensive consideration. As
will be remembered this third question pertained to the applicability
of HusserFs theory of truth to logical truths and other complex
meanings.
As it stands up to this point, the Husserlian theory is not yet
even able to handle the truth of sentences like "This house is white".
The basic model outlined above is merely designed to capture "truth"
in cases of primitive, simple meanings like "red", or "house". Nothing
has been said, however, as to which kinds of perceptions can
serve to fulfill categorematic terms like "is" or "this", or sentence
forms like "This S is P".
Since the correspondence theory of truth is one of the most
important foundation stones of the calculus conception of language,