Dasein - Monoskop

216 PART III
quotation alludes to the possibility that Heidegger read some writings
of the later Wittgenstein—Heidegger owned a copy of the Philosophical
Investigations (von Herrmann)—and that he found himself,
at least in some places and despite his overall critical assessment,
in sympathy with what he encountered. Below I hope to show that
actually there were quite a few ideas in the early as well as in the
later Wittgenstein that Heidegger could have appreciated. This is
not to deny, as Heidegger himself pointed out to his student Otto
Poggeler, that there are indeed "unbridgeable differences in the respective
questions" 322 of his and Wittgenstein's. Heidegger might
also have been right in saying that Apel's interpretation has resulted
in a "new kind of Chinese" 323 , even though such an accusation coming
from Heidegger sounds very curious. But all this does not rule
out the possibility that even quite different philosophical projects
can lead to insights that are highly reminiscent of one another.
To return to Heidegger's characterization of the position he seeks
to overcome, i.e., the theses (t)-(v), the question as to how well Heidegger
was acquainted with the analytical philosophy of language
cannot be sufficiently answered at the present time, that is as long
as Heidegger's library is not made accessible to scholarly research. 324
Let us therefore turn to more systematic concerns and remind ourselves
how naturally theses (t)-(v) apply to the view of language
as calculus. What is characteristic of the opponents that Heidegger
envisages are two fundamental tenets: that we can take a stand outside
of our language, and that language can be manipulated. Each
of these tenets leads to further consequences: the former belief first
raises its head in the contention that language is used as a means of
communication, as something speakers use to convey to each other
their pre-linguistic intentions (above p. 211 first quotation). Second,
the belief in our ability to take a stand outside of our home
language also informs the idea that we can talk about language, that
a metalanguage is possible in which we can speak about our home
language. Third, this belief leads to the assumption that language
can be formalized, that language can be as it were disconnected from
its world-disclosing function, in order to be treated purely syntactically.
And fourth semantical relations between language and the
world are accessible. Heidegger does not state this implication of