Dasein - Monoskop

HEIDEGGER'S ONTOLOGY AND LANGUAGE AS THE UNIVERSAL MEDIUM 157
In the same context, Heidegger goes on to say that "no modification
of this scheme can overcome its inadequacy" 89 , and he deplores
the "disastrous invasion of this scheme into phenomenological
research". 90 Finally, in 1928 Heidegger writes that Husserl failed,
like Brentano before him, to draw the proper conclusions from their
insights into intentionality, the first and most important conclusion
being that the very notions of consciousness and human being have
to be recast in non-traditional terms. 91 Giving up the subject-object
distinction is the key to an adequate conceptualization of intentionality
and the original transcendence on which it is grounded: the
" Being-in-the-world" 92
Thus Heidegger does not only hold that Husserl sticks to a misleading
terminology; he also claims that Husserl has fallen prey to
the misleading implications and temptations of this terminology. As
for the need to start both from a systematic analysis of Being-in-theworld
as the foundation of intentionality and from an analysis of the
original phenomenon of transcendence, Heidegger writes that "neither
Bergson—and he least of all, along with Dilthey—nor Husserl
sees the problem and the phenomenon". 93 In fact, Heidegger claims
that Husserl has not only neglected the problem, but has even distorted
the whole issue of the original and most basic relation of the
human being to the world.
As Heidegger points out in his most extensive criticism of
HusserFs phenomenology, the "Prolegomena to the History of the
Concept of Time" (1925), Husserlian phenomenology touches upon
the problem of the world only in the context of a theoreticallyoriented
perception of some worldly object. That is to say, the central
paradigm of intentionality for Husserl is what one might term
explicit perceptual identification—that is, the explicit 'picking out' of
an object—or, more technically, the deliberate focussing of perceptual
attention on an object. What is lost right from the start, however,
is the network of meaningful objects that are—always already—
implicitly identified by us in our dwelling and doing, objects that
we are acquainted with without our needing to focus our attention
on them. And what is worse, HusserFs paradigm of intentionality
is ill-suited to capture Dasein's self-identification, that is Dasein's
way of determining who it (he, she) is, and wants to be.