Dasein - Monoskop

106 PART II
new Sinn ... Furthermore, in the Sinn lies the 'content 9 which
explicates itself in predicates 390
To return to our example, the noematic Sinn consists, on the one
hand, of the predicates "my", and "computer screen" and, on the
other hand, "that something" of which I say that it is mine and
a computer screen. Husserl calls this "that something" "the determinable
X in the noematic sense" 391 , claiming that we have to
assume the determinable-X in addition to the predicates in order
to account for changing perceptions (which implies changing predicates)
of the same object. For example, I might see "that" which a
moment ago I saw as my computer screen, as "my TV screen". In
this case the predicate has changed, but the determinable-X has not.
Husserl develops an elaborate account of changing perceptions,
and further determinations, of one and the same object. From Ideas
I onwards, Husserl suggests that every act, say, of perception, "predelineates"
possible further perceptions of the same object ("internal
horizon") as well as perceptions of further, other objects in the world
("external horizon"). 392 While the noematic Sinn of the original act
is said to be "explicit", the noematic Sinn of these further, possible
acts are called "implicit". 393 Husserl points out that the possible further
perceptions predelineated in the horizon of an act are not mere
empty, or logical, possibilities but "motivated possibilities". They
are motivated by the original act and by the background knowledge
of the subject, as the following example aptly shows:
It is an empty possibility that this writing-desk has on its underside,
which is presently invisible to me, ten legs instead of
four, as is actually the case. This fourness, on the contrary, is a
motivated possibility for the definite perception that I directly
perform. 394
This brief characterization of the noema and its structure suffices
for our purposes of highlighting some of its features from the
calculus conception of language.
Now the first point which merits attention here is the relation
between noema and language. 395 Husserl tells us that his notion of
Sinn is not immediately to be equated with meaning qua linguistic
meaning: