Dasein - Monoskop

126 PART III
individuals. Despite the sketchiness of HusserFs remarks, these pronouncements
are as good as any to provide evidence for the existence
of model-theoretical ideas in his conception of logic: after ail, what
the pronouncements concerning truth logic and logic of consequence
boil down to is the distinction between provability and validity. 497
The logic of consequence is the logic of an uninterpreted system,
whereas the logic of truth is the logic of an interpreted one. What
throws decisive light on this distinction from our vantage point is the
observation how natural, on the one hand, this kind of distinction
is for a follower of Hilbert (and thus for an adherer to the calculus
conception), and how strange, on the other hand, it must seem to
anyone abiding by Fregean principles. Frege takes logic to be tightly
linked to the one and only actual world, but Husserl regards it as
possible to study the meaning-system of logic without relating it
to any world at all or—in truth logic—by relating it to alternative
models, i.e., different worlds. Whereas Frege argues that "the laws
of logic are first and foremost laws in the realm of references [Bedeutungcn]
and only relate indirectly to sense" 498 , and whereas he
holds that in formal logic we are to take reference to "the True" and
"the False" as basic, HusserFs logic of consequence proceeds in the
opposite direction: it concentrates on senses:
Analytics is a pure systematic theory of the region of what are
strictly and properly senses [Sinne], only in its two lower strata:
as the pure theory of forms of senses (or meanings) and as the
pure analytics of non-contradiction. ... Its theme excludes all
questions of truth; for precisely these, with the predicate "true"
(and all its modifications), go beyond the Apriori that pertains
purely to the proper essence of the sphere of senses .. . 499
In passing it is worth noting that HusserFs views on logic were
not developed in ignorance of Frege's work. In HusserFs library (preserved
at the archive in Lou vain) one finds all of Frege's major works.
Most of them show marks of intensive study, a curious exception being
Frege's review of Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic. Husserl
also worked his way through the Begriffsschrift, making annotations
and writing an extra page of comments. 500 Furthermore, HusserFs
attitude towards formal, mathematical logic always remained a ba-