Dasein - Monoskop

148 PART M
3. THE WORLD AS A "CLOSED WHOLE"
THE PERIOD OF BEING AND TIME
3.1. Introduction: Heidegger 1919-30
In this chapter I shall deal with Heidegger's philosophy, roughly from
1919 to 1930. This is the phase where the existential analysis of
Dasein is Heidegger's main concern.
Dating the beginning of this period as 1919 is somewhat arbitrary,
and based solely on no material being currently available on the
courses that from 1916 to 1918 Heidegger taught on "Kant and 18th
Century Philosophy" (1916), "Aristotle's Logical Writings" (1916),
"Truth and Reality (Basic Problems of Epistemology)" (1916/17),
"Hegel" (1917), "Plato" (1917/18), and "Lotze and the Development
of Modern Logic" (1918/19). 62 Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann,
Heidegger's private assistant during the seventies, has informed me
that Heidegger did not keep any of his notes for these courses. In fact,
Heidegger told von Herrmann that during this early stage of his academic
career he did not believe "that these notes would ever become
'manuscripts'". Interestingly enough, from 1919 onwards, Heidegger
must have changed his mind on this issue, and indeed the preserved
texts and lecture-notes from about 1919 onwards (like the lectureseries
"The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Weltanschauung"
(1919) 63 , "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion"
(1920/21 ) 64 , "Augustine and Neoplatonism" (1921) 65 , "Phenomenological
Interpretations of Aristotle—Introduction to Phenomenological
Research" (1921/22) 66 , as well as the critique of Jasper's Psychology
of Worldviews (written between 1919 and 1921 ) 67 ) show clearly
that Heidegger had already by that time developed many of the most
important tenets of Being and Time 68 .
The dating of the end of "the period of Being and Time" as
1930, as I have done, is also open to questioning and debate. However,
it is apparent that, starting with the lecture "On the Essence of
Truth" (1930) 69 , Heidegger later abandoned his existential analysis
of Dasein as the key to the question of Being. Heidegger gave up this
approach because he came to realize that it had still been bound to
Husserlian—and, more generally, traditional—presuppositions. Heidegger
had wanted (in the period of Being and Time) to pass beyond