Dasein - Monoskop

174 PART III
the importance of this notion by arguing that, just as some vague
understanding of reality precedes and is presupposed by our ability
to identify and experience realities, and just as some vague understanding
of actuality precedes and is presupposed by our ability to
encounter actual things, so also some vague and implicit understanding
of Being (das Sein) precedes and is presupposed by our ability
to encounter and understand beings (Seiende). Therefore philosophy
has to start by asking "What does Being signify?" and "How
is understanding of Being at all possible?" 159
With respect to these ontological questions, Heidegger's most
fundamental criticism of Husserl's phenomenology consists of three
interrelated claims. First, Husserl has neglected the question concerning
Being. Second, Husserl's neglect is a result of his falling prey
to traditional unquestioned presuppositions concerning the meaning
of Being. And third, Husserl's methodology—especially the system
of reductions—is in principle incapable of even posing the question
concerning the meaning of Being.
As we have seen in the last section, in order to undermine
the 'folk-theoretical' distinction between immanence and transcendence,
Heidegger drew on Husserl's claim that in perceiving something
we are intentionally related to the thing itself. When turning
to HusserFs transcendental phenomenology, however, Heidegger accuses
Husserl of relying precisely on this superficial distinction:
It is true that every transcendent perception apprehends what
is perceived by it, the thing, in its bodily character, but there
is always the possibility that what is perceived cannot be and
is not. In immanent apprehension, however, lived experience is
given in its absolute self. 160
Heidegger's attack on this distinction between immanence and
transcendence, which is but another version of the subject-object
dichotomy, concentrates on the question how Husserl explains the
Being of consciousness. Heidegger tries to show that the characteristics
that Husserl enumerates are nothing but traditional notions—
notions, in other words, that are not arrived at by an unprejudiced
look at the phenomena. Thus Husserl speaks of consciousness as
"immanent", "absolute", and "pure" Being, as well as "quod nulla