Dasein - Monoskop

BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS - GADAMER'S HERMENEL'TICS 233
situation is limited, it has a horizon of things and ideas within its
reach: "Horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that
can be seen from a particular vantage point." 6 Now since Gadamer
speaks of a fusion of such horizons, more precisely, of the fusion of
the horizon of the interpreter with the horizon of the text, the question
arises as to who is the agent or subject performing the action
of fusing. In some contexts, Gadamer's answer, in accordance with
the earlier passages, seems to be that the fusion of horizons, far from
being the doing of the interpreter, is the work of tradition, or, more
specifically, language: "The guiding idea ... is that the fusion of the
horizons that takes place in understanding is the proper achievement
of language" 7 Here one is naturally reminded of Heidegger's claims
that language speaks for us and that we thus should accept language
as our master.
Gadamer also seems to be saying that the interpreters' horizon
is never of their own making. The dependency of interpreters
upon tradition rests on the fact that all their interests towards certain
questions and answers with respect to a given text are predelineated
by "effective-history" (Wirkungsgeschichte) as the sum of
former interpretations and/or the general impact of tradition. Truth
and Method seems to call on interpreters to accept this dependency.
Accordingly, Gadamer demands that one accepts the status quo and
that one refrains from striving for abstract ideals: "In other words, I
take it to be scientific to accept what is the case rather than to start
from what could be or should be the case ..." 8 The late Heidegger
would not have called this attitude "scientific", he would have
termed it "poetic" or a "thinking" attitude, but otherwise he would
have certainly agreed.
Gadamer's attack on "enlightenment" also seems to be well in
line with Heidegger. From Heideggerian premisses, enlightenment
cannot but be regarded as a mistaken conception of the human being's
place in history. After all, enlightenment stressed the role of
the subject-agent and its task of freeing itself from tradition and
prejudice, i.e., its task of determining its own history. In full agreement
with Heideggerian views on enlightenment, Gadamer suggests
in some places that the aim of his philosophical hermeneutics is a "rehabilitation"
of prejudice and authority 9 , and he accuses enlighten-