Dasein - Monoskop

98 PART II
is not within the world cannot even be within it, and everything
which is possible within it is actual within it. ... if it is possible
that within a world there are experiencing acts that come to
know that world and that constitute that world phenomenologically,
then these acts ... must really appear in that world. 352
More important than this argument, whose interest mainly lies
in the fact that Husserl also shows himself to be acquainted with
this further modal model in Leibniz, is the fact that both philosophers
take almost the same stand concerning the issue of transworld
identity, a topic also widely discussed in contemporary analytical
philosophy. The debate here is over the question whether the same
individual can be a member of several possible worlds or not. Saul
Kripke 353 and Alvin Plantinga 354 are perhaps the best known advocates
of the former stand, whereas Leibniz and Lewis 355 argue for
the view that individuals are bound to one world and that identity
across possible worlds is a senseless notion. Leibniz held this position
on account of his conviction that all attributes are essential; for
him it makes no sense to ask "what would have happened if Peter
had not denied Christ" since this question amounts to asking "what
would have happened if Peter had not been Peter, for denying is
contained in the complete notion of Peter". 356 Leibniz also thought
that in picking out one complete concept, say of Adam, we in fact
pick out a whole world: since Adam mirrors all other concepts within
his world, if anything—even thousands of years later—were different
from what it is, Adam would not have been Adam. 357
In the following passage we can see that Husserl agrees with
Leibniz on both of these ideas, the denial of transworld identity as
well as the interconnection of all events and facts within one world:
The universe of free possibilities in general is a realm of disconnectedness;
it lacks a unity of context. However, every possibility
which is singled out of this realm signifies at the same
time the idea of a whole of interconnected possibilities, and to
this whole necessarily corresponds a unique time. Each such
whole defines a world. But two worlds of this kind are not connected
with each other; their "things", their places, their times,
have nothing to do with one another; it makes no sense to ask