Dasein - Monoskop

170 PART III
Every practical object, tool, material has readiness for something.
Readiness is a character that belongs to something
present(-at-hand). This character characterizes it as something
which is not yet explicitly used. Once it is used, it passes into
an eminent present [Gegenwart], i.e., into an eminent presence
[Anwesenheit]. Before that happens, it [the practical object]
is merely disposable. When used, however, it moves, in a certain
way, closer towards me. In being-used it becomes, so to
say, actual [wirklich]. ... The difference between actuality and
readiness is this: in both cases we are dealing with something
present(-at-hand). ... But in the two cases it is present in a
different mode of obtrusiveness. 141
Demonstrating that the genuine meaning of Being for Aristotle
is presence(-at-hand), a notion that Aristotle presupposes rather
than explicates, is, however, only one part of Heidegger's interpretation.
The other part centres on the observation that Aristotle's
investigation into the meanings of Being is conducted primarily as
an investigation into language. The categories to which the other
meanings of Being are ultimately related are read from "the declarative
sentence, the sentence that says something about a being that is
present-at-hand". 142 With this move, Aristotle, according to Heidegger,
errs in two ways. By regarding the genuine, most fundamental
meaning of Being as linked to the theoretically-oriented sentence, he
treats that meaning not only as linked to the sentence, but also as
linked to the theoretical.
It is important to note here that Heidegger arrived at this observation
under the joint influence of both Aristotle and Husserl. According
to Heidegger's own later report, he owed the idea that Being
is not essentially linked to judgments to Husserl's theory of categorial
intuition: "With these analyses on categorial intuition Husserl
freed Being from its localization in the judgment." 143 That is to say,
Husserl showed that an understanding of Being is implied in all intentional
relating to objects in the world. But from where Heidegger
originally gained the further insight that the genuine meaning of Being
has to be disentangled from the theoretical attitude cannot be
equally easily determined. After all, the notion of the primacy of the
practical was important in a good many of the authors that Heideg-