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Dasein - Monoskop

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64 PART II<br />

to investigations five and six, we will be able to encounter even more<br />

evidence to the same effect.<br />

3.5. Truth, Realism, and Knowledge about Abstract Objects<br />

Investigations five and six are by far the most difficult of the Logical<br />

Investigations. It would not be an exaggeration to say that they<br />

carry the burden of proof for several of the most central premisses<br />

of the whole work: they demonstrate that we do indeed have access<br />

to reality, that is to say, they refute idealism; they defend a nonrelativistic<br />

notion of truth; and they present an answer to the question<br />

how we are able to acquire knowledge about abstract meaning<br />

entities in the way presupposed in investigation four. Thus investigation<br />

five and especially six give Husserl's conception of language as<br />

calculus its ultimate justification (as far as the Logical Investigations<br />

are concerned).<br />

Before turning to these major topics, I want to draw attention<br />

to something of a minor theme of the fifth and the sixth investigations.<br />

This theme is not crucial for an understanding of what<br />

Husserl is doing here, but it will show its true significance once we<br />

have encountered Heidegger's and Gadamer's account of the same<br />

issue. What I have in mind is the distinction between picture and<br />

sign. As we shall see below, especially Gadamer stresses that language<br />

is misconstrued when looked at as a system of signs, and he<br />

conceives of language as a picture of reality. From this perspective<br />

it is interesting to note that Husserl in the last two investigations<br />

takes up the same problem but answers it in favour of the very sign<br />

conception that Gadamer opposes.<br />

Husserl draws the distinction between sign and picture by saying<br />

that in the case of the picture there exists a relation of similarity<br />

between the picture itself and what is pictured. In the case of the<br />

6ign this similarity is purely coincidental and generally absent. Now<br />

in the case of language there is no similarity between word and thing:<br />

Husserl holds that signitive act and perceived object have "nothing<br />

to do with one another*} 17 Were Husserl to stop here, the difference<br />

between him and Gadamer would have to be noted but would<br />

not as such be especially exciting. What makes the difference more<br />

dramatic is the way in which Husserl goes on to qualify his stand

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