Dasein - Monoskop

PART IV
EPILOGUE:
BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS
—GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS
Zwischen Husserl und Heidegger—und
Hegel ...
(self-characterization by H.-G. Gadamer)
Das ist nicht mehr Heidegger!
(M. Heidegger about Truth and Method)
1. INTRODUCTION
In the main body of this study we have seen that Husserl and Heidegger
take radically different stands on such key philosophical issues
as the accessibility of semantics, the possibility of a re-interpretation
of language, the intelligibility of speaking of worlds in the plural,
the possibility of avoiding (linguistic) relativism and (semantical)
Kantianism, the correct account of truth, and the justifiability of
metalanguage and formalism. However, the main objective of the
interpretation in parts II and ID above was not (only) to draw attention
to this list of differences but also to explain them as resulting
from two fundamentally opposed ways of conceiving of language; to
wit, to conceive of language as either being something like a reinterpretable
calculus, or being as it were a universal medium of
meaning. While Husserl and Heidegger were shown to stand on opposite
sides of this divide, each of them turned out to be in respectable
company: Husserl in that of modern semantical theory, Heidegger
in that of Frege and Wittgenstein. Indeed it was an important byproduct
of our interpretation that the differences between Husserl
and Frege over such questions as, for example, truth, the feasibility
of metalogic, semantics, and the calculus ratiocinator vs. characteristica
universalis distinction, could be led back to the same fundamental
opposition between two ways of looking at language that also
divides Husserl and Heidegger.
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