Dasein - Monoskop

146 PART III
to treat this chapter as giving us some indications as to how Heidegger's
subsequent work—that ultimately lead to Being and Time—got
under way.
Heidegger formulates three basic demands for future investigations
into categories, the Scotistic doctrine of which he had tried
to interpret in the first part of his study. The first is described
as "the characterizing demarcation between different areas of objects
into categorial regions that cannot be reduced to one another".* 2 This
demand does not yet amount to a step beyond Husserl, for Heidegger
is probably thinking here merely of a clear distinction between the
realms of the psychological, the logical, the physical, and the mathematical,
a distinction that was also crucial in Husserl's project.
Heidegger is more explicit as concerns the second demand, "the
placing of the problem of the categories within the problem of the
judgment and the subject 17 . 54 This does not as such sound like a new
program, but as Heidegger spells out the implications of this "placing",
he clearly goes beyond what Husserl had in mind. This is already
indicated by Heidegger's promise that in elaborating this point
he will draw attention, "at least in a most general outline, to the necessity
of a metaphysical settlement of the problem of knowledge". 55
Heidegger claims that the central notions of logic and contemporary
epistemology, like those of subject and object, immanence and
transcendence—which in turn are but special versions of the general
form/matter distinction—need to be reconsidered: "The 'form vs.
matter' duplicity is today a decisive tool in working on epistemological
problems. Therefore, a principal investigation into the value
and the limitations of this duplicity has become inevitable." 56 Logic
alone is insufficient to deal with this problem, since logic is confined
to forms and since logic presupposes the matter as given. Thus logic
and its problems can be studied only from a "translogical", 57 that
is, metaphysical, perspective:
In the long run, philosophy cannot do without its genuine optic,
that is, metaphysics. Concerning the theory of truth this
means the task of an ultimate metaphysical-teleological interpretation
of consciousness. The valuable already lives originally
in the consciousness, because consciousness is meaningful and
meaning-realizing living deed. This deed has not been under-