Dasein - Monoskop

144 PART III
ger interprets Scotus' ens logicum and ens in anima as Husserlian
noematic Sinn, claiming that Scotus tried to make a distinction between
the noetic, i.e., the subjective in intellectuy and the noematic,
i.e., the logicum. 41 Fourth, the distinction between prima and secunda
intentio is identified with the distinction between the natural
and the reflective stand in phenomenology. 42
In Heidegger's treatment of the Grammatica speculativa and of
some other Scotistic pronouncements in the domain of meaning, the
Husserlian perspective goes even beyond occasional references and
comparison, becoming the central framework of interpretation. For
instance, Scotus' ideas on the relation between word and meaning
or, more generally, sign and meaning, are couched in the terminology
of the first of the Logical Investigations. Heidegger points out—just
like Scotus and Husserl—that the domain of meanings must be set
apart from language as sign system, despite the fact that meanings
can be expressed only with the help of words:
The identity of the realm of meanings remains untouched in its
Geltung, despite all differences in the sound-structure of particular
languages, and despite the fact that the content [of this
realm] may be "grasped" and brought to an understanding in
quite different forms of words and sentences. 43
Heidegger also sees something of a parallel between Scotus' idea according
to which the domain of meanings is set apart from the domain
of things, and the Husserlian epoch6; thus he claims that for
Scotus "meaning presents itself... as detached from all realities" 44
and that "in the act-character of meaning-bestowing the specific accomplishment
of position taking [concerning existence] is absent". 4 *
Furthermore, Heidegger goes to great pains to interpret the
pseudo-Scotistic—that is Thomas of Erfurt's—distinction between
modi significandi, modi intelligendi, and modi essendi in terms of
noema, noesis, and other phenomenological concepts. For instance,
modus significandus activus is identified with the noesis, while modus
significandus passivus is identified with the noema. 46 In line with
Husserl's notion of constitution as manifestation, Heidegger also interprets
Thomas' demand to derive modi significandi and intelligendi
from modi essendi. The Being of objects (modi essendi) is to be ar-