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Multiagent Systems

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Prof. Dr. Jürgen Dix · Department of Informatics, TUC <strong>Multiagent</strong> <strong>Systems</strong>, WS 06/07 232/731<br />

3. Decision Making (1) 3. (Im-) Perfect Information<br />

This leads to the notion of subgame perfect Nash<br />

equilibria:<br />

Definition 3.30 (Subgame perfect Nash equilibria)<br />

Let G be a perfect information game in extensive form.<br />

Subgame: A subgame of G rooted at node h is the<br />

restriction of G to the descendants of h.<br />

SPE: The subgame perfect Nash equilibria of a<br />

perfect information game G in extensive form<br />

are those Nash equilibria of G, that are also<br />

Nash equilibria for all subgames G ′ of G.

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