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Multiagent Systems

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Prof. Dr. Jürgen Dix · Department of Informatics, TUC <strong>Multiagent</strong> <strong>Systems</strong>, WS 06/07 337/731<br />

5. Nets and coalitions<br />

We define the task allocation problem in precise terms<br />

and present different types of contracts between agents.<br />

We show that no IR-contract leads to the global<br />

optimum, even if all types are allowed.<br />

We then consider abstract coalition formation for<br />

characteristic function games (CFG) and introduce<br />

several algorithms for searching the coalition structure<br />

graph. We introduce the core of a CFG and end with the<br />

Shapley value for payoff division.<br />

This chapter is based mainly on work done by Tuomas<br />

Sandholm.

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