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Multiagent Systems

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Prof. Dr. Jürgen Dix · Department of Informatics, TUC <strong>Multiagent</strong> <strong>Systems</strong>, WS 06/07 323/731<br />

4. Decision Making (2) 3. Auctions<br />

Example 4.25 (Incentive to counterspeculate)<br />

Suppose bidder 1 does not know the (private-)<br />

value v 1 of the item to be auctioned. To<br />

determine it, she needs to invest cost. We also<br />

assume that v 1 is uniformly distributed:<br />

v 1 ∈ [0, 1].<br />

For bidder 2, the private value v 2 of the item is<br />

fixed: 0 ≤ v 2 < 1 2<br />

. So his dominant strategy is to<br />

bid v 2 .<br />

Should bidder 1 try to invest cost to<br />

determine his private value? How does this<br />

depend on knowing v 2 ?

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