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Multiagent Systems

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Prof. Dr. Jürgen Dix · Department of Informatics, TUC <strong>Multiagent</strong> <strong>Systems</strong>, WS 06/07 252/731<br />

3. Decision Making (1) 4. Repeated Games<br />

Problem: Nash equilibria in sequential games<br />

might exist in the first stages, but not<br />

later.<br />

Solution: We consider subgame perfect Nash<br />

equilibria: Nash equilibria that remain<br />

Nash equilibria in every possible<br />

subgame.

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