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Citizens’ Voice and Accountability Evaluation – Bangladesh Country Case Study However, it is not clear to what extent there has been any lasting institutional change in the various government bodies with whom Samata members interact (UP, Land offices etc.) that would imply continuity of improved service delivery. Such improvements may only be apparent where there is a constant threat of confrontation and exposure. This clearly limits the development impact TIB has made attempts to quantify savings made from reducing or removing bribe-giving and ‘speed money’ to access public services and direct implications for poverty reduction can be derived. However, when LGED and its donors promote CVA, the motivation is less related to poverty reduction and has more to do with promoting local ownership of development projects and reducing (government) construction and maintenance costs. By addressing community infrastructure priorities, the assumption is that there will be a greater willingness of the community to maintain them both directly and through a willingness to pay local taxes. Similarly, cost efficiencies are promoted by encouraging transparent contracting procedures at local level. The ideology of the CVA component of ROSC is not concerned with income poverty reduction directly but with finding a way to involve, particularly marginalised, parents in their children’s education and demanding schooling more appropriate to their children’s needs. The short term costs are likely to increase for these parents as their children’s direct and indirect earning opportunities are displaced by school and some, albeit low, costs associated with school attendance are incurred. The advocacy programmes (e.g. of CAMPE) and media support organisation (MMC) have difficulty in relating their work to poverty reduction goals. It is this pressure to do so by one of MMC’s donors that has driven it to work in relatively remote areas and in direct social mobilisation outside of its core competency. We argue that the work of MMC to promote and protect grassroots journalism is intrinsically important in enabling freedom of speech and exposure of different points of view (i.e. voice is itself an important ‘end’ and not only a ‘means’). It should not need to have to prove a direct impact on poverty reduction. Similarly support to platforms for dialogue (e,g, GTZ brokered dialogue, BBC Sanglab (supported by DFID but not included in this study) and USAID sponsored Round Table discussions on democracy and related issues), which the team feels are extremely valuable, can be appreciated on the same basis of promoting open dialogue (multiple voices) rather than higher development goals. ‘We Can’, Samata and Rupantar all have contributed enhancing the environment for claiming private social entitlements (e.g. through improved gender relations) which can be linked to MDGs and poverty reduction. However, again the team feels that too often too much pressure is exerted on programmes such as these to prove impact on wider development goals. 32
Citizens’ Voice and Accountability Evaluation – Bangladesh Country Case Study 5 Lessons learned In this section we outline lessons learned from the above discussion. We organize lesson learning using the four evaluation research questions listed in Section 2.2 above. 5.1 Channels, mechanisms and processes It is clear from the evaluation that donors in Bangladesh have creatively identified channels, mechanisms and processes for enhancing CVA. Donors have relied quite heavily on funding NGOs as intermediaries supporting both the demand-side and supply-side of the state-citizen interface. However, this strategy brings attendant risks around conflict of interests and claims of corruption. There can be a conflict of interest here if these NGOs are also working on the demand-side and supporting communities to raise voice. Maintaining independence is important. If the NGO builds its own relationship with, for example, the UP then this may distort the intended interface between the UP and community. Similarly, performance monitoring on both supply and demand sides becomes inter-dependent and compromises both. There is also a risk of politicising donor intervention in the eyes of Government by giving support to NGO/CSO advocacy. These risks extend to the contracting of NGOs by Government under donor interventions. Many NGOs are reluctant to be contracted by Government as it limits their independence and they are not prepared to be monitored and supervised by governmental agencies. How can they criticise the “hand that feeds” them? The advantage of using NGOs which is much flaunted internationally is that they can be the source of innovation, yet NGOs in our cases questioned how they could be innovative when bound by government contracts. In their rush to support NGOs, either directly or via Government, donors have exposed themselves and the communities they are serving, to the danger of duplication in their efforts by working through intermediary NGOs to build the capacity of state and non-state actors and to support political inclusion. There is no clearer indication of this risk that the proliferation of committees and NGO presence in a community or local area. We also noted the relatively small number of efforts by donors to tackle CVA issues at the level of the central government, largely a function of the (pre Caretaker Government) prevailing political climate but also perhaps reflecting the relative quick wins at the local level interface of state and citizen. Donor attempts to “scale up” successful CVA channels, mechanisms and processes have created risks, including the risk of overloading the technical and financial absorptive capacity of the implementing organisations. For example, Samata was provided a massive budget primarily from DFID Bangladesh 24 and it was expected to deliver results from the outset. Despite provision within the project design for extensive technical assistance to its finance and human resources divisions, the expectations to transform what was essentially a people’s movement with humble youth club origins into a professional NGO were hugely ambitious. It was also not what the Movement itself wanted as it diverted attention from their core mission. One can question whether the transformation required was really needed for the 24 Personal communication indicates that DFID Bangladesh could only justify full project status and allocate their administrative time if the project budget exceeds £5 million. 33
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Development partner Strategic inten
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IV Relevant Primary and Secondary d
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II: Overall Assessment of Intervent
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Impact According to the 2007 Impact
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Model of change Assumptions Activit
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D.8. Bangladesh Sanjukta Sramic Fed
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Effectiveness BSSF provides 22 trai
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. Model of change Assumptions Activ
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D.9. Rupantar Grassroots Women’s
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Impact Phase 1 resulted in a cadre
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Figure 1. Rupantar CVA Model of Cha
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Table 2. Most significant change an
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D.10. Samata - Empowerment Through
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Lessons Learned Important lessons l
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Table 2. Most significant change an
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D.11. GTZ brokered dialogue within
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Sustainability GTZ feels that the f
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Project (Donor) Partners/ PIUs Inte
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Project (Donor) Partners/ PIUs Inte
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Annex F. Summary of Stakeholder Deb
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