Bangladesh - Belgium

Citizens’ Voice and Accountability Evaluation – Bangladesh Country Case Study
was not predicted and opens up a number of opportunities for Voice
organisations, but budget lines are difficult or impossible to re-negotiate with
donors and surpluses cannot be reallocated.
Fourthly, CVA interventions involving changing attitudes and behaviour of both
citizens (confidence building, feelings that they will be taken seriously, can
influence) and duty bearers (willingness and commitment) take time (e.g. LGED
has been plugging away at this since the early 90s and still has not embedded a
positive mindset among UPs to work with citizens) but most projects have short
life spans. SDC will fund for longer periods but most others do not fund more
than two cycles (6 years, (2x3years)). Six years is an inadequate time scale for
CVA outcomes. Furthermore, second phase funding is contingent on first phase
achievements so there is pressure on the implementing organisation to
demonstrate results in first phase when perhaps only ground work can be
realistically achieved.
• Materials and resources generated still tend to target the word and picture literate
(see findings 4.4). The messages in the advocacy material, leaflets and other
information materials in circulation, seen by the study team and discussed with
community members are largely inaccessible. Duplication is very much in
evidence with many organisations producing their own Information Education
Communication (IEC) materials (which may even dilute or confuse the messageconventional
wisdom suggesting that campaigns benefit from simple unified
messages). Such materials are visual and thus easily verifiable indicators of
awareness raising action (tangible outputs). However, we feel that they can be a
smokescreen and perhaps further the marketing objectives of the organisations
more than genuine information sharing and knowledge transfer with intended
beneficiaries. It is important that the materials are field tested and have proven
impact on intended audiences to justify the investment.
Finally, an important lesson from the evaluation of channels, mechanisms and
processes is that if the ideal of a democratic society is for it to be pluralistic then
donors need to be creative in finding ways to fund groups other than NGOs.
It takes courage to fund a social movement. The decision for DFID to fund Samata
was ground-breaking at the time and has not had an easy ride subsequently as
waves of different personnel within DFID Bangladesh have prioritised different
intervention ideologies. For example, it did not have much support as DFID
Bangladesh adopted a strongly neo-liberal pro-economic growth stance from 2003-5.
Social movements are not NGOs and have not acquired the same professional
orientation to strategy, projects and budgets. They thus present fund administration
and monitoring challenges. They are generally responsive to emergent issues which
are not only hard to capture but arguably should not be captured in log frames and
other similar frameworks. This spontaneity is what makes the organisation successful
and meets members’ needs. Furthermore, social movements are highly political
albeit not necessarily partisan. The confrontational approach to demanding rights
puts movement workers and members at risk and, by association, can put donors in
politically compromising positions. A social movement is fiercely defensive of its own
ideology and approach and makes a difficult partner for donors who are trying to
meet a variety of their own agendas (often at odds with the underlying principles of
the movement) in their funding. For example, DFID Bangladesh expected Samata to
provide specific data on return on investment related only to land acquisition and
derive a figure for its direct contribution to poverty reduction. Samata repeatedly
explained that many groups meet regularly and have done so for more than 20 years
without ever securing rights to land so there were other important benefits from
Movement membership, some of which had economic implications (reduced bribe
giving, reduced waiting time for services, access to entitlements such as school
stipends) but many had social and political benefits. As a result of their
unpredictability, lack of experience of being recipients of aid and their unwillingness
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