Bangladesh - Belgium

Citizens’ Voice and Accountability Evaluation – Bangladesh Country Case Study
5 Lessons learned
In this section we outline lessons learned from the above discussion. We organize
lesson learning using the four evaluation research questions listed in Section 2.2
above.
5.1 Channels, mechanisms and processes
It is clear from the evaluation that donors in Bangladesh have creatively identified
channels, mechanisms and processes for enhancing CVA.
Donors have relied quite heavily on funding NGOs as intermediaries supporting both
the demand-side and supply-side of the state-citizen interface. However, this strategy
brings attendant risks around conflict of interests and claims of corruption. There can
be a conflict of interest here if these NGOs are also working on the demand-side and
supporting communities to raise voice. Maintaining independence is important. If the
NGO builds its own relationship with, for example, the UP then this may distort the
intended interface between the UP and community. Similarly, performance
monitoring on both supply and demand sides becomes inter-dependent and
compromises both. There is also a risk of politicising donor intervention in the eyes of
Government by giving support to NGO/CSO advocacy.
These risks extend to the contracting of NGOs by Government under donor
interventions. Many NGOs are reluctant to be contracted by Government as it limits
their independence and they are not prepared to be monitored and supervised by
governmental agencies. How can they criticise the “hand that feeds” them? The
advantage of using NGOs which is much flaunted internationally is that they can be
the source of innovation, yet NGOs in our cases questioned how they could be
innovative when bound by government contracts.
In their rush to support NGOs, either directly or via Government, donors have
exposed themselves and the communities they are serving, to the danger of
duplication in their efforts by working through intermediary NGOs to build the
capacity of state and non-state actors and to support political inclusion. There is no
clearer indication of this risk that the proliferation of committees and NGO presence
in a community or local area.
We also noted the relatively small number of efforts by donors to tackle CVA issues
at the level of the central government, largely a function of the (pre Caretaker
Government) prevailing political climate but also perhaps reflecting the relative quick
wins at the local level interface of state and citizen.
Donor attempts to “scale up” successful CVA channels, mechanisms and processes
have created risks, including the risk of overloading the technical and financial
absorptive capacity of the implementing organisations. For example, Samata was
provided a massive budget primarily from DFID Bangladesh 24 and it was expected to
deliver results from the outset. Despite provision within the project design for
extensive technical assistance to its finance and human resources divisions, the
expectations to transform what was essentially a people’s movement with humble
youth club origins into a professional NGO were hugely ambitious. It was also not
what the Movement itself wanted as it diverted attention from their core mission. One
can question whether the transformation required was really needed for the
24 Personal communication indicates that DFID Bangladesh could only justify full project
status and allocate their administrative time if the project budget exceeds £5 million.
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