The Jewish Trail of Tears The Evian Conference of ... - Haruth.com

subject nor would it seek joint action with other Western Governments. 111 However, if a
specific case involving an American Jew did arise Dodd was to informally call upon the
German Government to protect the rights of all United States citizens; an approach that
was variably effective. 112 These laws, he believed, were the harbinger of more severe
restrictions against the Jews and did not represent “the last word…on this question.” 113
During 1937 the Third Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Berlin, Jacob D. Beam,
predicted that Nazi attempts at forced migration as a means of resolving its Jewish
Question would inevitably be unsuccessful due to lack of sufficient foreign exchange.
Consequently, the German Government would adopt such policies that would make
Jewish life in Germany “uncomfortable, if not impossible” and would result in falling
Jewish birth rates. Therefore, German Jews would “die out in the course of one or two
generations.” The Embassy also believed that external diplomatic or economic pressures
were incapable of altering German anti-Semitic policies. Rather, “outspoken protests”
would only result in “stiffening resistance” and any form of compromise was impossible
as it would appear to be a form of “submission to foreign dictates.” 114
Dodd was eventually recalled from his post due to official German criticism and
pressure from Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles and was replaced by Hugh R.
Wilson, a devoted anti-Communist, who possessed a more liberal, conciliatory and less
critical view of Germany. Joseph Davies, one-time American Ambassador to Moscow,
111 862.4016/1580 Dodd to Hull, November 15, 1935, FRUS, 1935, II, 409-412.
112 862.4016/1580 Hull to Dodd, January 21, 1936, FRUS, 1938, I, 194.
113 Dodd to Hull, September 17, 1935, FRUS, 1935, II, 279.
114 Mayer to Hull, Report on National Socialist Internal Policy, August 2, 1937, Department of State
862.00/3667. Ibid., 91.
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