The Jewish Trail of Tears The Evian Conference of ... - Haruth.com

organizations] that there was “very little chance” for mass resettlement abroad; a view
reinforced by the statements of the delegations at Evian. Consequently, Malcolm
concluded that any “large-scale scheme of migration” [Jew or Christian non-Aryan]
attempted during a time of high unemployment “could only arouse hostility” by creating
an “alien element inside the State concerned.” Therefore, any relocation of refugees must
be made on an individual basis via a “process of infiltration” that would foster
assimilation aided by the appropriate private organizations. Successful resettlement, in
turn, depended upon the provision of land, specialized training and sufficient financing.
Private organizations, however, lacked sufficient funds to carry out such work
singlehandedly and required governmental contributions. Although the High
Commissioner believed that the Evian Conference offered “a very great opportunity”
backed by the “enormous prestige” of Roosevelt and European nations he believed that
the project was doomed to failure unless suitable places of resettlement were provided. 31
Such reticence, German Nazis noted, provided “courage” to lesser nations to voice “their
reluctance to permit new Jewish emigration.” 32 Erika Mann and Eric Estorick observed
that the most “outstanding” consequence of the Conference was a general consensus that
“something should be done” but in the absence of an official and government willing to
“assume the burden of action, nothing was done.” 33
FDR selected Myron C. Taylor, a personal friend, Quaker and a retired
Chairman of U.S. Steel, to head the American delegation. Despite his lofty title of
31 “Proceedings,” July 9, 1938, 32-35.
32 “No One Wants to Have Them,” Voelkischer Beobachter, July 13, 1938.
33 Mann and Estorick, “Political Refugees,” 151.
259