The Jewish Trail of Tears The Evian Conference of ... - Haruth.com

delegate rationalized why his nation could not act they simultaneously “congratula[ted]
themselves on how much had already been accomplished for refugees.” 32
Thomas C. Howard and William D. Pederson regarded it as “astonishing” that
Roosevelt called for a refugee conference as legislative limits made the Administration
“virtually powerless to act.” The United States’ sole contribution was to combine the
annual German and Austrian quotas while framing the official invitation in a manner that
did not require the invitees to liberalize their own domestic regulations. Consequently,
Taylor and the American delegation lacked any “bargaining power.” The ultimate
letdown of the meeting was a “foregone conclusion.” 33
Francis Nicosia claimed that the
inherent “contradictions in the policies” of the attendees predicted failure. Countries of
potential refuge called for German collaboration in the “speedy and orderly emigration”
of German and Austrian Jews coupled with retention of sufficient personal assets to
facilitate resettlement while simultaneously maintaining or increasing national barriers to
immigration. 34
Caroline Moorehead regarded the Evian Conference as a “shameful milestone in
the history of refugee affairs.” Its sole success was the establishment of a “feeble
intergovernmental committee on refugees” that could not engage in successful
negotiations with the German Government. Nor could pressure be brought to bear on
Great Britain (the Mandatory Power) over Palestine, to allow increased levels of Jewish
32 Marrus. The Unwanted, 170-172.
33 Thomas C. Howard and William D. Pederson, eds., Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Formation of the
Modern World (NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003), 196.
34 Francis R. Nicosia, The Third Reich & the Palestine Question (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 2000), 157.
321