The Anthropology Of Genocide - WNLibrary

genocide in bosnia-herzegovina, 1992‒1995 197
and genocide—an orgy in violence—that had started three years earlier in Northern
and Eastern Bosnia in order to establish a Serbian state rid of all non-Serbs
(that is, Bosnian Muslims and Croats). In its final report, the U.N. Commission of
Experts for the International Criminal Tribunal researched the developments in
the municipality (Opstina) of Prijedor. Their findings formed the bases for the later
indictments of individual Serbs for crimes against humanity and genocide. The report
that was published on December 28, 1994, concludes: “It is unquestionable
that the events in Opstina Prijedor since 30 April 1992 qualify as crimes against humanity.
Furthermore, it is likely to be confirmed in court under due process of law
that these events constitute genocide.” 10
The campaign of “ethnic cleansing” had been preceded by a rhetorical campaign
of exclusion (intolerance), fear, and hatred. For instance, in Sarajevo in 1992,
on the eve of the war, the Bosnian Serb nationalist leader Radovan Karadzid uttered
what was to become his personal mantra throughout the war waged to carve
out an ethnically homogeneous Serbian state in ethnically diverse and complex
Bosnia-Herzegovina: “We cannot live with the Muslims and the Croats, for there
is too much hatred, centuries old hatred. Serbs fear the Muslims. They cannot live
together. Because of genocide committed against them (the Serbs), they have to defend
themselves.” In a speech to the Bosnian parliament, he also threatened people
with a war that might result in the disappearance of the “Muslim people” (Muslimanski
narod ) should they go ahead and vote for independence. 11 His words were
echoed by General Ratko Mladid when he gave a casually chosen Muslim schoolteacher
the responsibility for disarming Muslim men in Srebrenica in the wake of
the Serbian takeover: “The Muslim people can disappear (nestati) or survive (opstati):
it’s up to you.” 12
The former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia had declared their
independence in June 1991. Within five months of Croatia’s declaring its independence
from Yugoslavia, the JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) and local Serb paramilitaries
occupied more than one-third of Croatia. (These were areas with a Serbian
and a Croatian population.) Fifteen thousand people were killed, and more
than 250,000 were driven from their homes. While war raged in Croatia, the mainly
Bosniac (ethnically Muslim) leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina and many of its citizens
hoped that war could be averted. However, with the majority of its population
being non-Serb, Bosnia-Herzegovina would not want to stay in a Yugoslavia
that would be no more than Greater Serbia. In a referendum held on February 29
and March 1, 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina voted in favor of independence, although
Serb-controlled areas did not participate. More than two months earlier, warlike
martial law conditions had been reigning in numerous cities and townships in Northern
and Eastern Bosnia, areas bordering on Serbia and/or with large Serbian settlements.
Here the Serb Nationalist Party, the SDS, led by Radovan Karadzid, had
not gained a majority in the 1990 elections but organized a parallel Serb administration
consisting of so-called Crisis Committees. These committees were secretly
arming local Serbs with guns coming from Belgrade and the JNA. 13 In November