The Anthropology Of Genocide - WNLibrary

developments in international law 319
that is difficult to determine with precision in the absence of a sincere confession
or public admission by the accused. The chamber provided another jurisprudential
roadway by maintaining that in the absence of a confession, the accused’s intent
can be inferred from a number of presumptions of fact. The chamber reasoned
that “it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act
charged from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically
directed against that same group, whether these acts were committed
by the same offender or by others” (ibid.:§6.3.1). Specific factors that the chamber
believed could enable it to infer the genocidal intent of a particular act included
the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, and the deliberate and systematic
targeting of people because of their membership in a particular group,
while excluding members of other groups.
Here the chamber offers a method for judicially constructing an individual’s
genocidal intent. This method involves placing an accused’s particular act(s) against
a victim within the broad context of prevalent and culpable acts directed at other
persons because they are members of the victim’s group, even if those acts were
perpetrated by persons other than the accused. The method turns an emic category—intent—into
an etic one—constructive intent. Hence an individual who attacks
only one person and never explains why can be convicted of genocide (a special
intent crime) as long as his one attack fits into an overall pattern of genocidal
acts by others against members of the same protected group.
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS A CRIME OF GENOCIDE
Those counts in the indictment charging Akayesu with the crime of genocide made
no specific reference to sexual violence or rape. However, noting that the Genocide
Convention and Article 2(2) of the ICTR statute offer as one of the definitions of
genocide the “causing [of ] serious bodily or mental harm to members of a group,”
the trial chamber chose to consider sexual violence in connection with the charge
of genocide. The three justices reasoned that acts of sexual violence constituted
genocide provided they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a particular group—in this case, the Tutsi. Rape and sexual violence certainly
constitute inflictions of “serious bodily and mental harm” on victims.
In light of all the evidence before it, the chamber was satisfied that the acts of
sexual violence (including rape) described by witnesses were committed solely against
Tutsi women, many of whom were subjected to the worst public humiliation, mutilation,
and multiple sexual violations on the municipal premises or in other public
places. These sexual attacks, the chamber concluded, resulted in physical and psychological
destruction of Tutsi women, their families, and their communities. Sexual
violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi
women and specifically contributing to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole.
The tribunal found that Akayesu had aided and abetted the acts of sexual violence
by allowing them to take place in his presence in or near the municipal build