The Anthropology Of Genocide - WNLibrary

genocide in bosnia-herzegovina, 1992‒1995 219
knowledgment of the genocide in the Serbian-run entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Many Serbs do not believe that the genocide ever took place, and they have no incentive
to believe otherwise (“if any Muslims were killed they were killed in combat
or attacking Serbs”). Indeed, the only story that is being told is that of the Serbs
as the victims, dying in defense of the Serbian homeland or in village raids by Muslim
terrorists. 39
The enormity of the crime in the face of an international presence brought the
international community and particularly the fraught U.N. peacekeeping mission into
deep crisis (which ended with NATO intervening). It has led to some soul-searching
(see the U.N. Srebrenica report) and some suggestions for reform, among others the
idea of a more specialized and permanent U.N. peacekeeping force. The Serbian
takeover and subsequent execution of almost the entire male population of the Srebrenica
U.N. “safe area” made a complete mockery of the “prevention” part of the
“Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” This
is particularly so inasmuch as the United Nations and the international community
already had detailed knowledge of the Bosnian Serbs’ political and military strategy
and of the willingness of Serbian forces to kill civilians on a large scale. The international
community through the United Nations has (almost in spite of itself ) established
a successful court to deal with perpetrators of genocide and crimes under the
Geneva Conventions. The process is well under way to ensure that the Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda will be turned into a permanent international
court with a worldwide jurisdiction. There remains the very difficult task
to decide and agree on strategies and mechanisms to prevent genocide.
If we want to take the part of the Genocide Convention that addresses prevention
seriously in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we (that is, scholars, international
organizations, and institutions) must keep up our engagement with postwar
Bosnia in order to prevent a replay of Srebrenica among those “who did not know”
and their victims. As scholars, first, we can contribute by continuing to research,
analyze, and write about social and cultural processes, institutions, and structures
that are conducive to massive human right abuses against individuals. And second,
we should work with our colleagues from the region and together look at ways in
which the past can be dealt with locally—not through omission or denial but by
ensuring that people are given a chance to acknowledge documented facts, and by
allowing for the painful process of recognition that certain political, military, and
emotional structures forced many of us into the role of silent bystanders, or even
accomplices.
NOTES
This paper draws on information gathered and observations made on several trips to Bosnia
during the war in 1993 and 1995, as well as field research conducted in 1987–88 and 1990.
In 1995, I visited Bosnia several times while I was based in Zagreb as political and policy
analyst for the special representative of the secretary general for the U.N. peacekeeping op