The Anthropology Of Genocide - WNLibrary

284 genocide’s wake
ernment protesters in 1998–99. Although with the death of Pol Pot and the defections
of Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, and other leaders in 1998–99 the Khmer
Rouge themselves ceased to constitute a serious threat, continued political infighting
among top officials of the ostensibly coalition government perpetuates
a climate of general political uncertainty and recurring violence. Cambodians
feel that there is always the possibility that society could collapse again into warfare
and destruction. 28 Some people regularly consult a work called the Buddh
Damneay, which is believed to contain prophecies by the Buddha about events that
will occur at the midpoint of the next kalpa, or cycle of time before the coming
of the next Buddha. The text speaks of multiple wars and devastation, and many
Cambodians believe that the horrors of the DK period fulfilled those prophecies
(see also Smith 1989). However, they cannot be certain that the time of destruction
is over and that the reign of the new and righteous ruler is at hand. Thus
they consult the text and wait, still fearful.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Cambodian genocide under Pol Pot drew international attention for its massive
death toll, which occurred in a small population within a short period. In addition,
the DK regime was infamous for its attempt to destroy cultural institutions
as well as people in its headlong plunge to “leap” into a revolutionary new society
more quickly than any other society in history (Chandler, Kiernan, and Boua
1988:36). DK obviously had a number of profound and disruptive effects on Cambodian
life, only some of which have been discussed here. What has particularly
struck us, however, is the remarkable strength of the Cambodian survivors we know,
who, after experiencing devastating social upheavals and personal traumas,
nonetheless got on with their lives. Also, possibly because the DK regime was so
short-lived, its effort to crush certain fundamental aspects of Cambodian society
and culture did not take hold. Thus after 1979 various elements of prerevolutionary
life—for example, families, Buddhism, private property, a market economy—
were revived, albeit with modifications caused by changing socio-political-economic
circumstances (see Ebihara 1993a).
Svay villagers remain peasant rice cultivators who lead a rather precarious existence,
with their harvests often diminished by droughts or floods and their small
savings suddenly drained by illness. As one man remarked with a sigh: “It’s still a
struggle to live; you still have to work hard to grow rice.” Some villagers may get
added income from other sources, such as nonagricultural jobs (for example, as
schoolteachers), financial assistance from offspring or relatives working in Phnom
Penh, or remittances from relatives who became refugees abroad. According to villagers,
relatively few households are “rich,” but most families have adequate resources,
and impoverished households are few (see ibid.). Over the course of periodic
visits to Svay between 1989 and 1997 we have seen many visible improvements