RESEARCHmeasure their current surveillance and staffing capacity forWNV and other arboviruses and compare findings withthose from the 2004 assessment (19). Its objectives wereto describe 1) national capacities for surveillance for WNVand other arboviruses in the 50 states and 6 ELC-fundedLHDs in 2012 and changes since 2004; 2) surveillance capacitiesof LHDs with historically high WNV burdens butno direct federal funding and how they compare with thosein ELC-supported LHDs; and 3) the outstanding needs tobring US arbovirus surveillance to full capacity.MethodsThe assessment tool was developed by a working groupthat included representatives from CSTE, the Associationof State and Territorial Health Officials, the National Associationof County and City Health Officials, the Associationof Public Health Laboratories, the CDC Divisionof Vector-Borne Diseases, and Emory University. Theworking group developed the 2013 survey by modifyingthe 2004 assessment tool and adding unique questions thatreflected new WNV surveillance, prevention, and controlguidance (20) and assessed specific staffing needs, presenceof Aedes aegypti mosquitoes, and effect of federalWNV surveillance funding reductions on WNV surveillanceactivities over the past 5 years.After pilot studies in 7 states and 4 LHDs, CSTEemailed the final state survey to the 50 state health departmentsand instructed key respondents to obtain relevantinformation from laboratory and mosquito surveillanceand control staff, and complete the assessment online.The Epi Info Web Survey System was used to collect responses(21). CSTE used a similar process for distributingthe assessment to 30 large city/county health departmentsthat met at least 1 of 3 criteria: 1) receive supplementalWNV surveillance funding through the ELC grant (n = 6[Washington, DC; New York, NY; Los Angeles County,CA; Chicago, IL; Houston, TX; and Philadelphia, PA); 2)had at least 100 cumulative reported cases of WNV neuroinvasivedisease during 1999–2012 (n = 22, excluding 4of the ELC-funded LHDs); or 3) had recent local denguetransmission (n = 2).The 2 assessments were analyzed separately. Frequenciesof response to each question were examined inaggregate and by groupings of state health departmentson the basis of whether they reported a need for additionalstaff. LHDs were grouped by whether they received federalWNV surveillance funding, which was referred to asELC-supported. Additional need to achieve full capacitywas based on response to the question, “How many additionalFTE (full-time equivalent) staff-persons are neededat the state level in your state to achieve full epidemiologyand laboratory capacity to conduct WNV and othermosquito-borne disease surveillance?” Full capacity wasdefined as 1) ability to complete a standard case reportform on every suspected/confirmed mosquito-borne arboviraldisease case and report it to ArboNET; 2) abilityto test for IgM for all relevant arboviruses (includingdengue) on any cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) or serum specimensubmitted to the state or city/county laboratory fora suspected case of arboviral disease); and 3) having anenvironmental surveillance system that includes mosquitosurveillance to “routinely monitor arboviral activityin all parts of the jurisdiction in which there is the potentialfor human outbreaks of arboviral disease based onpast experience.”For staffing-related questions, nonresponses werecoded as no staff needed. For all other questions, nonresponseswere assumed to be missing responses. Differencesof >10% between groups being compared were deemedfunctionally useful and are highlighted in the results. Dataanalysis was performed by using Microsoft Excel (Microsoft,Redmond, WA, USA) and Epi Info <strong>version</strong> 7 (CDC,Atlanta, GA, USA).ResultsAll 50 states (100%), all 6 ELC-supported LHDs (100%),and 15 LHDs without ELC support (62.5%) responded.In 2012, nearly all states (98%) conducted surveillancefor human WNV disease; fewer conducted WNV-relatedsurveillance for equine disease (90%), mosquitoes(80%), and avian deaths (39%) (Table 1). Less than 60%of jurisdictions contacted medical specialists (neurologists,critical care, infectious disease) to encourage reportingof suspected WNV cases, and less than one thirdhad an active surveillance component for human surveillance.Although only 80% of states conducted mosquitosurveillance, 90% collected information about mosquitosurveillance from LHDs in their state, including 86% bymosquito species. Overall, 46 (94%) states had at leastsome information on mosquito populations, either bycollecting it themselves or from LHDs. It took a medianof 6 days (range 1.5–17 days) from the date a WNVpositivehuman specimen was collected for data to be reportedto the WNV surveillance program, and a medianof 16.5 days (range 4–45 days) from date of onset to datereported to ArboNET.Fewer jurisdictions in 2012 than in 2004 conductedWNV-related surveillance activities, particularly aviandeaths (26 states, −59%), active human surveillance (9states –18%), contact with infectious disease specialists(12 states, –24%), and state-level mosquito surveillance (8states, –16%). In addition, the percentage of states respondingthat most LHDs in their state conducted adult mosquitosurveillance decreased from 48% to 34% (Table 1). Therewas a slight improvement in timeliness of reporting, from amedian of 7 days to 6 days.1160 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 21, No. 7, July 2015
Arbovirus Surveillance in the United StatesTable 1. States conducting selected West Nile virus surveillance activities, United States, 2004 and 2012*No. responding states (% with activity) % Difference fromSurveillance activity2012 20042004 to 2012Human surveillanceFormal surveillance system 50 (98) 49 (100) 2Active surveillance component 49 (29) 49 (47) 18Use official case definition 50 (88) 49 (88) 0Require reporting of encephalitis of unknown etiology 50 (48) 49 (63) 15To encourage reporting and to suggest a high index of suspicion, did you contactNeurologists 48 (50) 48 (60) 10Critical care specialists 48 (48) 49 (57) 9Infectious disease specialists 48 (58) 49 (82) 24Equine surveillanceFormal surveillance system 49 (90) 49 (94) 4Active surveillance component 44 (5) 46 (24) 19Designated public health veterinarian within the agency?Yes 50 (76) 49 (82) 6Avian surveillanceFormal avian death surveillance 49 (39) 49 (98) 59Active component 19 (10) 48 (44) 34Sentinel chicken surveillance 50 (10) – NAAdequate access to wildlife expertise within agency 50 (76) 49 (92) 16Mosquito surveillanceFormal surveillance system 49 (80) 49 (96) 16Collect information about mosquito surveillance from LHDs in state? (states only)Yes 49 (90) 49 (94) 4By species? 43 (86) 45 (80) +6Do most LHDs in your state conduct surveillance for (states only)Adult mosquitoes 44 (34) 44 (48) 14Larval mosquitoes 44 (18) 44 (30) 11Adequate access to entomologist in agency or by contract 50 (64) 49 (71) 7*–, not asked; NA, not applicable; asked; LHDs, local health departments.In 2012, 92% of states had some public health laboratorycapacity for WNV testing to support human surveillanceand 84% to support mosquito surveillance (Table 2). Most(93%) states tested human specimens for IgM and mosquitospecimens by using PCR (72%) or culture (13%). Relativelyfew states tested human specimens by using PCR(13%) or culture (2%). When compared with 2004, manyfewer laboratories conducted IgG, PCR and culture tests onhuman specimens in 2012. Testing methods for mosquitoesdid not change greatly.We also assessed state public health laboratory capacityto test for 10 arboviruses, in addition to WNV, in humanserum or CSF specimens. St. Louis encephalitis (SLE)virus testing capacity was most common (34 laboratories),followed by testing for eastern equine encephalitis (EEE)(24), western equine encephalitis (WEE) (16), LaCrosse(16), dengue (9), Powassan (4), chikungunya (2), Coloradotick fever (2), yellow fever (2), and Japanese encephalitis(1) viruses. These laboratories reported performing 41,159tests for arboviruses in 2012, of which 19,180 (46.6%)were for WNV. Of these tests, the highest percentage ofpositive test results was for dengue virus (137/328, 41.8%),followed by WNV (2,953/19,178, 15.4%), Powassan virus(62/1,257, 4.9%), LaCrosse virus (121/3,372, 3.6%), SLEvirus (164/8,216, 2.0%), Colorado tick fever virus (2/139,1.4%), and WEE virus (12/3,888, 0.03%).Although many laboratories had the capability to test forarboviruses other than WNV, not all routinely did so. Overall,26 (60%) of 43 responding laboratories reported routinelytesting human CSF specimens submitted for WNV for atleast 1 other arbovirus. Of these 26 laboratories, 24 routinelytested for SLE virus, 12 for EEE virus, 6 for WEE virus, 5 forLaCrosse virus, and 2 for Powassan viruse. Among laboratoriesserving the 45 states that either test mosquitoes or useanother laboratory, 24 reported routinely testing mosquitopools for SLE virus, 22 for EEE virus, and 13 for the Californiaserogroup. To manage federal WNV surveillance fundingreductions over the past 5 years, 57% of states reportedeliminating avian death surveillance, 58% decreased mosquitotrapping, 68% decreased mosquito testing, and 46%decreased the number of human specimens tested for WNV.The responses from the 6 LHDs with ELC WNV surveillancesupport to each surveillance capacity were similarto those from the 50 states in 2004 and 2012, exceptfor laboratory capacity. Currently, only 4 ELC-supportedLHDs do some of their own WNV testing.Arboviral Surveillance in LHDs withoutFederal WNV Surveillance SupportThe 15 LHDs without ELC grants included 13 with highWNV burden and 2 with recent dengue transmission. TheseLHDs were generally less likely to take an active role inEmerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 21, No. 7, July 2015 1161
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July 2015SynopsisOn the CoverMarian
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BOOKS AND MEDIAin the port cities o
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ABOUT THE COVERNorth was not intere
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Earning CME CreditTo obtain credit,
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Emerging Infectious Diseases is a p