RESEARCHTable 2. States with laboratory capacity to support WNV and other arboviral surveillance activities, United States, 2004 and 2012*No. responding states (% with activity) % Difference fromLaboratory capacity2012 2004 2004 to 2012OverallHave some in-state capacity for WNV testing 50 (92) – NAHuman surveillanceTest for IgG 46 (48) 47 (72) 24Test for IgM 46 (93) 47 (100) 7Test by culture 46 (2) 47 (19) 17Test by PCR 46 (13) 47 (49) 36Test by PRNT 46 (22) 47 (21) +1Test all CSF specimens submitted for WNV for ≥1 other arbovirus 43 (60) – NAAvian surveillanceTest by culture 46 (4) 47 (13) 9Test by PCR 46 (39) 47 (77) 38Test IgG or IgM 46 (11) 47 (9) +2Test by any of above methods 46 (43) 47 (77) 34Mosquito surveillanceIn-state capacity to test mosquitoes (state or local level) 50 (84) – NATesting for >1 other arbovirus 42 (81) – NACulture or PCR 42 (81) 47 (81) 0Vec Test or RAMP 42 (19) 47 (21) 2*WNV, West Nile virus; –, not asked; NA, not applicable; PRNT, plaque reduction neutralization test; CSF, cerebrospinal fluid; Vec Test, vector test;RAMP, rapid analyte measurement platform.surveillance for human disease or avian deaths than the 6LHDs with ELC WNV surveillance support (Table 3). Furthermore,they were less likely to conduct their own mosquitosurveillance (67% vs. 100%); 5 LHDs did not conductany mosquito surveillance. LHDs that conducted mosquitosurveillance tended to more consistently conduct larval surveillanceand identify trapped mosquitoes to species.Few of these 15 LHDs had their own laboratory capacityto support either testing of human specimens (n =1) or mosquitoes (n = 3) for WNV. Most were dependenton their state health department for this function.Staffing Levels and Need for Additional StaffingA total of 503 persons worked on arbovirus surveillance instate health departments in 2012. Of these, 206 worked atleast half-time on it and 297 worked less than half-time. Overall,40% of those working at least half-time were CDC funded.When converted to FTEs, there were 208.9 FTEs workingon arbovirus surveillance in state health departments in 2012;17% were epidemiologists, 31% laboratory workers, 27%mosquito surveillance staff, and 25% support staff (Table 4).In the 21 LHDs, 187 persons worked on arbovirus surveillancein 2012; a total of 104 worked at least half-timeTable 3. Local health departments conducting selected WNV surveillance activities, by whether they received federal WNVsurveillance funding (ELC) support, United States, 2012*No. responding LHDs (% with activity) % Difference between noSurveillance activityNo ELC support ELC support ELC and some ELC supportHuman surveillanceFormal local-level surveillance system 15 (0) 6 (100) 100To encourage reporting and suggest a high index of suspicion, did you contactNeurologists 15 (33) 6 (83) 50Critical care specialists 15 (47) 6 (83) 36Infectious disease specialists 15 (47) 6 (100) 53Emergency departments 15 (53) 6 (100) 47Equine surveillanceFormal surveillance system 15 (33) 55 (39) 6Designated public health veterinarian within the agency?Yes 15 (33) 6 (50) 17Avian surveillanceFormal avian death surveillance 15 (20) 6 (67) 47Mosquito surveillanceFormal surveillance system 15 (67) 6 (100) 33For larval mosquitoes? 10 (90) 3 (67) +23For adult mosquitoes? 10 (100) 6 (100) 0Identify trapped mosquitoes to species? 10 (90) 6 (83) +7Calculate minimal mosquito infection rates? 10 (50) 6 (83) 33Adequate access to entomologist in agency or by contract 14 (31) 6 (50) 19*WNV, West Nile virus: ELC, epidemiology and laboratory capacity (received specific WNV surveillance funding through the Epidemiology and LaboratoryCapacity Cooperative Agreement); LHDs, local health departments.1162 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 21, No. 7, July 2015
Arbovirus Surveillance in the United StatesTable 4. FTE positions for arbovirus surveillance in 2012 and additional FTEs needed by functional job category, 50 states and 21local health departments, United States*Characteristic FTE epidemiologists FTE laboratory staffFTE mosquitosurveillance staffFTE support andadministrative staff Total FTEsState2012 34.6 (16.6) 64.6 (30.9) 57.2 (27.4) 52.5 (25.1) 208.9No. needed 25.1 (20.5) 26.4 (21.5) 53.6 (43.7) 17.5 (14.3) 122.6Total 59.7 91.0 110.8 70.0 331.5Local2012 32.8 (19.3) 7.4 (4.4) 93.9 (55.6) 34.8 (20.6) 168.9No. needed 6.2 (9.7) 7.5 (11.7) 36.3 (56.5) 14.2 (22.1) 64.2Total 39.0 14.9 130.2 49.0 233.1*Values are no. (%). FTE, full-time equivalent.and 83 worked less than half-time on it. Similar to statehealth departments, only 35% of the at least half-time timestaff were CDC funded (either directly or through the state).These persons accounted for 168.9 FTEs: 19% were epidemiologists,4% laboratory workers, 56% mosquito surveillancestaff, and 21% support staff (Table 4). LHDs had thesame proportions of FTEs involved in mosquito surveillance(56%), regardless of whether they were ELC-supported.Staffing Changes from 2004 to 2012and Additional NeedsIn states and the 6 LHDs with ELC grants for WNV surveillance,the overall numbers of persons working in arbovirussurveillance and the numbers of those working atleast half-time on it decreased from 2004 to 2012. In states,the decreases were 28% (from 702 to 503) and 41% (from348 to 206), respectively (Figure 1). In LHDs, these decreaseswere 18% (from 228 to 187) and 5% (from 109 to104), respectively.Regarding staffing needs, 40 (80%) states reportedneeding 122.6 additional FTEs, a 59% increase over currentcapacity: 27 needed epidemiologists, 30 laboratory staff,28 mosquito surveillance staff, and 19 support staff. Of the122.6 needed FTEs, the single largest category was mosquitosurveillance staff, which accounted for 44% of additionalneed, followed by laboratorians (22%). For LHDs, 64.2 additionalFTEs were needed, a 38% increase, and most (57%)needed positions in mosquito surveillance staff (Table 4).Association of Staffing Needs with Level ofArbovirus SurveillanceStates needing more staff were less likely to conduct WNVand other arbovirus surveillance activities than those withno need. States needing more epidemiologists were lesslikely to have conducted outreach to encourage medicalspecialists to report WNV cases (Figure 2, panel A). Thesestates were also less likely to have performed year-endcatch-up surveillance by contacting hospital or commerciallaboratories (0% vs. 16%). States reporting a need for laboratorianswere less likely to have at least some WNV testingcapacity, perform testing on mosquito pools in 2012,and test WNV-positive specimens for other mosquitoborneviruses and were more likely to report a reduction inmosquito pool testing capacity since 2008 (Figure 2, panelB). States needing additional mosquito surveillance staffwere less likely to test mosquito pools and to have identifiedany Ae. aegypti mosquitoes in the past 5 years andwere more likely to have decreased the numbers of mosquitotrap-nights and mosquito pools tested and report thattheir mosquito testing capacity had decreased since 2008(Figure 2, panel C).DiscussionThere are several critical objectives of arbovirus-relatedsurveillance at each level of government: 1) monitor forand detect early signs of an outbreak threat to enable atimely response and prevent human illness and death; 2)monitor for arboviruses of human health concern and theirvector populations; 3) detect changes in arbovirus diseaseburden over time and space; and 4) inform the public ofthe risks and how they can decrease them. Several findingsfrom this assessment highlight the current capacity to meetthese objectives and help to inform federal, state, and localpublic health and preparedness officials interested in evaluatingtheir current arbovirus surveillance capacity.First, current surveillance capacities at the national andstate levels are far greater now than those in 1999, beforethe introduction of WNV. Almost all states are conductingsurveillance for human WNV disease, and most aremonitoring mosquito populations for WNV and have someFigure 1. Total and at least 50% time staff performing West Nilevirus surveillance in state health departments, United States, 2004and 2012.Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 21, No. 7, July 2015 1163
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July 2015SynopsisOn the CoverMarian
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1240 Gastroenteritis OutbreaksCause
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SYNOPSISDisseminated Infections wit
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LETTERSInfluenza A(H5N6)Virus Reass
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