Annals of the History and Philosophy of Biology

Holism, Coherence and the Dispositional Concept of Functions
However, Michael Esfeld has given an account of holism that is both precise and substantial.
In this section, I shall briefly present this account.
Esfeld's invites us to "regard a system as holistic if and only if the things which are its
parts have some of the properties that are characteristic of them solely within the whole"
(Esfeld 1998, p. 367). Thus, the basic content of the concept is a certain kind of ontological
dependence of the parts of a system from its whole. This dependence is such that the parts
would not have some of their characteristic properties, would they not be part of the
system. Hence, a sand heap is not a holistic system because the sand particles can have
their characteristic properties (shape, size, chemical composition) in isolation. Similarly,
an ordinary electronic circuit is not a holistic system, because its parts (transistors, capacitors,
resistors, etc.) can have their characteristic properties even when they are not
assembled to a circuit. Thus, holism on Esfeld's account is different from the trivial
claim that some systems have properties that the parts of the system lack, or that a part
of the system may be causally influenced by being a part of the system. These claims are
trivial because anything that deserves to be called a system will have properties that the
parts lack, namely properties that arise from the interactions between the parts. Furthermore,
in any system of interacting parts the properties of the parts may be causally affected
by the overall state of the system. By contrast, genuinely holistic systems show a
very specific kind of dependence of the parts on the whole.
It is crucial for Esfeld's conception that the dependence of the properties of the parts
of the system on the properties of the whole is not causal dependence. Holism in this
sense is not committed to controversial ideas involving macro-determination or topdown
causation. In holistic systems sensu Esfeld, something else is going on: Any individual
part of the system that has property F is, with respect to its being F, ontologically
dependent on some other individual that is G where this dependence is not causal (F and
G can be identical). Properties that show this characteristic may be termed holistic properties.
For example, it has been suggested that systems of beliefs are holistic systems, and that
beliefs have holistic properties. This is so because – so it is argued – beliefs can only
have conceptual content or be confirmed if they are suitably connected to other beliefs
that have content or are confirmed. This dependence is not causal; that is, the claim is not
that beliefs can only arise as a causal consequence of there being other beliefs (in fact,
some beliefs may be directly caused by sensory input). The claim is rather that something
can only have some of its characteristic properties if it is part of a system with other
things that that have some of these properties. (I am not defending this claim; this is just
to illustrate holism). Esfeld analyses this dependence as generic ontological dependence.
Generic ontological dependence is intended as a broad category that applies not just
to genuinely holistic properties, but also to straightforward relational properties. My
being a sibling is ontologically dependent on someone else also being a sibling, namely
my sister. Without her, I couldn't exist as a sibling. Thus, there is nothing mysterious
about generic ontological dependence; it is a straightforward consequence of there being
relational properties.
But relational properties do not necessarily lead to holism. In order for some system
to be holistic, according to Esfeld, some additional requirements must be met: There
Annals of the History and Philosophy of Biology, Vol. 10 (2005)
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