Annals of the History and Philosophy of Biology

198
Annals of the History and Philosophy of Biology, Vol. 10 (2005)
Marcel Weber
pendently of the other constituents. The thesis under consideration here is not that these
dispositions or capacities are holistic properties, but that whether or not some capacity is
a biological function depends on there being a suitable arrangement of capacities such
that many other capacities are also functions. On the present account, a function is not
merely an immediate causal role but a certain relation of many causal roles.
Condition (1) seems more problematic at first. First, is there really a family of properties
in the case of biological functions? It seems that we have only one property here: the
property of having a biological function. However, Esfeld does not require that all the
members of the family of properties are holistic. For example, it is consistent with his
account to say that a system of beliefs is holistic only with respect to confirmation, but
not with respect to meaning. 5 By analogy, we could say that a system of capacities is
holistic only with respect to their functional status. Note also that to have a biological
function is a qualitative generic, determinable property like mass or meaning – nothing
can have a biological function simpliciter; if something has a biological function it has a
specific biological function (the heart does not have a biological function simpliciter; it has
the specific function of pumping blood). Thus, biological functions are equivalent in all
respects with other relational properties that are thought to be holistic by some philosophers,
for example, meanings. 6 The meanings of beliefs are determined by the beliefs'
place in a web of inferential relations, while the biological functions of the parts of an
organism are determined by the parts' place in a system of capacities that together best
explain the organism's capacity to self-reproduce.
Note also that, in semantic holism, the relevant holistic system is a system of beliefs,
not the person who has these beliefs. It would be odd to say that someone's beliefs are
constituents of this person. At best, they are constituents of someone's mind, which is
not a thing but a complex set of properties. Analogously, we don't say that an organism's
functions are constituents of the organism. Its guts, mesoderm and epidermis and their
various differentiations are the organism's constituents. The biological functions are
parts of a coherent system of capacities, which are intrinsic and specific (determinate)
properties and which are functions themselves. In other words, individual functions are
constituents of a system of functions. Hence, the relevant holistic system S here is not the
organism, but it's system of biological functions. In this manner, biological functions as
construed under the coherence account satisfy Esfeld's condition for holistic properties,
and an organism's system of functions those for a holistic system.
The second problem with condition (1) is the issue of whether it is really the possession
of a biological function that makes something a constituent of a system S. However,
I suggest that this is also a matter of interpreting the system S correctly. Intuitively, one
might feel that the relevant system ought to be the organism. But in this case, condition
(1) is hardly applicable, because it is not the having of a particular function that makes
5 For Quine, holism with respect to confirmation implies holism with respect to meaning because he holds a
verificationist account of meaning (Quine 1953). But without further assumptions this is not implied by
saying that confirmation is a holistic property.
6 Note that some philosophers have tried to reduce meanings to biological functions (see Millikan 1984); this
is not my goal here.