Annals of the History and Philosophy of Biology

196
Annals of the History and Philosophy of Biology, Vol. 10 (2005)
Marcel Weber
must be, for every constituent of a system S, a "family of qualitative properties which
make something a constituent of an S in case there is a suitable arrangement" (Esfeld
1998, p. 375). For holistic systems, the following conditions must be satisfied for all its
constituents:
with respect to the instantiation of some of the properties that belong to such a family of properties,
a thing is ontologically dependent in a generic way on there actually being other things together
with which it is arranged in such a way that there is an S (ibid.).
As a corollary, the following definition of a holistic property can be given (ibid.): A relational
property is holistic exactly if
(1) It belongs to a family of properties which make something a constituent of
an S in case there is a suitable arrangement.
(2) Nothing can instantiate this property unless there actually are other things
together with which this thing is arranged in such a way that there is an S.
Esfeld's major candidates for holistic systems and holistic properties are systems of beliefs,
social systems (with respect to individuals having intentional states) and quantum
systems. In the context of beliefs, there exists a family of qualitative properties (conceptual
content, confirmation) that can be arranged in such a way that makes them constitutive
parts of a system. Presumably, the arrangement consists in standing inferential relations
in this case. With respect to any belief instantiating any of the qualitative properties,
it is ontologically dependent on there being other things that instantiate some of these
properties and on there being a suitable arrangement – at least according to semantic
holists such as W.V.O. Quine (Quine 1953).
What interests us here is whether biological functions are holistic properties and, mutatis
mutandis, biological organisms holistic systems. Esfeld himself is skeptical concerning
this possibility:
A thing which is a piece of flesh with respect to certain non-relational properties can merely not
exercise the function of a blood pump if there is no blood. But, independently of its being a constituent
of an organism, such a thing has a number of properties which make it function as a heart
in case it is arranged with other things in a suitable way. […] Therefore, a functional definition of
organs is not sufficient to make a case for holism. I do not intend to rule out that organisms are
holistic systems. But the dependence on other things in order that the properties which a thing
already has are exercised in such a way that this thing fulfills a certain function is not sufficient for
a substantial case of holism (Esfeld 1998, p. 376).
As is evident in this passage, Esfeld takes functional properties to be simple relational
properties that supervene on a thing's causal dispositions and its immediate arrangement
with other things. These properties are not holistic in Esfeld's sense because the causal
dispositions themselves show no ontological dependence on the properties of other
constituents in the system. However, as we have seen in Section 2, not any of the relational
properties of the parts of an organism should count as biological functions, and
the immediate causal relations of something are not sufficient to give them functional
status. I have presented an account of functions according to which it is the place of
certain capacities in a coherent system of capacities that underwrites their status as func-