Annals of the History and Philosophy of Biology

Charles Darwin‘s Moral Sense – on Darwin’s Ethics of
Non-Violence *
Eve-Marie Engels
Abstract
The overall aim of this article is to redress some of the deeply rooted and widely held prejudices against
Charles Darwin’s ethics and social theory. The topic is in particular Darwin’s consideration of ethics as
laid out most prominently in his book on the descent of man. By allowing Darwin to ‘speak for himself’,
I hope to deprive simplified biologistic interpretations of their basis. Moreover, my aim is to present some
other, surprising results. In contrast to widely held expectations connected with Darwin, I want to show
first of all, that his ethics is not primarily a biological ethics, that it, secondly, does not constitute an
evolutionary ethics, and that thirdly, it does not constitute what is called ‘Social Darwinism’. The title of
my article intends to emphasize how important Darwin thought it was for us to cultivate a moral sense
and to refrain from violence in order to develop and preserve this moral sense. Although for explaining
the possibility of natural selection among organisms Darwin drew on the population principle put forth by
the British national economist Thomas Robert Malthus and adopted the idea of a “struggle for life” as
the motor of natural selection, Darwin did not adopt the economist’s theologico-metaphysical premises.
For Malthus nature and its laws – in this case the population principle – are invested with a normative
status whose recognition and description are at the same time the formulation of a norm prescribed by
God. Darwin divorces Malthus’ principle from its theologian and normative framework. This law serves
him exclusively as a means for explaining the descent of species, not as a moral or ethical rule. This fact
is significant for an adequate assessment of Darwin’s ethics.
Introduction – the goals of this contribution
Since the appearance of Charles Darwin’s work On the Origin of Species by Means of
Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (1st ed.
1859) and his Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, published twelve years
later (1st ed. 1871), 1 many different, in part contradictory expectations, apprehensions
and prejudices have been associated with his name. What filled the one with hope, gen-
* This translation is a slightly modified version of my article entitled “Charles Darwins moralischer Sinn – Zu
Darwins Ethik der Gewaltlosigkeit” in Julia Dietrich, Uta Müller-Koch (eds.): Ethik und Ästhetik der Gewalt.
Paderborn: Mentis 2005. I thank Dr. Susan Nurmi-Schomers for her excellent translation.
1 For the sake of simplicity, the following abbreviations will be used when Darwin’s works are mentioned:
Origin of Species, Descent of Man and, for The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1st ed.
1872) after the first complete citation, Expression.
Annals of the History and Philosophy of Biology, Vol. 10 (2005): 31-54
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