Annals of the History and Philosophy of Biology

Charles Darwin’s moral sense – on Darwin’s ethics of non-violence
him, the population would double every twenty-five years, and this would lead to a gross
misproportion between available food and the number of persons in need of it. As he
argues, this situation has not come about yet, however; the rate of growth in population
has stayed more or less within limits which correspond to the available means of subsistence.
Malthus attributes this to the constant effect of a law of nature which he sees as
acting with more or less force on every society, inhibiting the growth of its population.
As he contends, in the case of human beings this occurs in one of two ways, through
“preventive checks” and “positive checks” (Malthus 1989 I, chap. 2). Checks of the first
kind are inherent to man on the basis of his exceptional mental capacities, he contends,
they enabling him to take into account the remote consequences of his actions. Such
“preventive checks” include late marriage and sexual abstinence. Wars, excesses, epidemics
and high rates of child mortality constitute “positive checks”, Mathus argues.
Malthus views this principle of population as a natural law established by God which
can be recognized with the help of revealed religion and experience of nature. Because
from a physico-theological perspective, laws of nature are an expression of the will of
God, nature becomes a framework of orientation for human action. Whoever resists its
laws disrespects the will of God and violates his commands. Thus from this standpoint,
poverty laws are an ill because they counteract the goal of controlling population growth
and thus the promotion of human happiness. And as is contended, we as individuals are
obligated to keep in check our benevolence towards the poor, it being no coincidence
that the “great author of nature” (Malthus 1989 II, pg. 213) created us to be dominated
by the passion of self-love, causing us to privilege self-interest to a high degree over benevolence
towards others and in doing so impelling us to take that course of action
which is essential for the preservation of the human species. Each individual primarily
strives for his own safety and happiness as well as that of his closest relatives, Malthus
contends. Because benevolence – were it to constitute a large and constant source of our
actions – would require complete knowledge of causes and their effects, it can only be an
attribute of God, not of man. In such a short-sighted being as man it would only lead to
grave errors and would transform cultivated society “into a dreary scene of want and
confusion.” So Malthus prophesizes (Malthus 1989 II, pg. 214). Like William Paley, who
Malthus makes positive reference to in various respects while nevertheless criticizing him
in some places, the latter views the assurance of the greatest happiness of the greatest
number of people as a moral and ethical goal which can best be realized by striving for
one’s own happiness. And Paley in turn cites Malthus’ population principle. 5 Nature and
its laws – in this case the population principle – are invested with a normative status
whose recognition and description are at the same time the formulation of a norm prescribed
by God. So the argument goes.
5 The position that pursuing one’s own happiness promotes the general good is reminiscent of Mandeville
and his fable of bees. Malthus explicitly distances himself from this position, however, and contradicts those
who interpret him as intending, in any way, to legitimize Mandeville’s moral system. As he posits, the system
is absolutely false and in fact completely contrary to the proper definition of virtue. “The great art of Dr.
Mandeville consisted in misnomers.” (Malthus 1989 II, pg. 214, fn. 19) To be sure, a more exacting investigation
would be required to discern whether the differences between Mandeville and Malthus are actually as
great as Malthus claims them to be.
Annals of the History and Philosophy of Biology, Vol. 10 (2005)
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