Annals of the History and Philosophy of Biology

Holism, Coherence and the Dispositional Concept of Functions
tions. On this view, nothing counts as a function unless there are lots of other things that
are also functions and this system of functions provides the best explanation for the
organism's capacity to self-reproduce. In the following section, I shall examine whether
this overturns Esfeld's own diagnosis with respect to holism and biological functions.
5. Functions as Holistic Properties of Complex Systems
A part of an organism may have any number of causal capacities. The heart, for example,
has a capacity to pump blood, to produce carbon dioxide, to make noises, to shake the
surrounding tissues, to respond to nervous and to hormonal signals, to stimulate immune
cells and develop chronic inflammation, to cause blood clots, and so on. Capacities
are traditionally not viewed as relational properties. Even though the heart's capacity to
pump blood is only realized in the presence of blood (or, perhaps, some surrogate fluid),
the disposition itself is intrinsic. Thus, the causal dispositions themselves are not even
candidates for holistic properties, as holistic properties must be relational. So far, Esfeld's
diagnosis is correct. However, his claim that a "functional definition of organs is not
sufficient to make a case for holism" seems to be based on a very wide sense of "function",
namely function as immediate causal role. This non-teleological sense of "function"
and "functional" is customary in the philosophy of mind. In the philosophy of
biology, by contrast, the term "function" is used in a more narrow sense, namely in a
teleological or quasi-teleological sense (depending on the exact sense of “teleological”). It
is this sense of function that we are trying to explicate here.
I have proposed an analysis of biological functions that individuates functions by
their place in a coherent system of capacities that together provide the best explanation
for the organism's capacity to self-reproduce. The heart's capacity to pump blood is a
biological function by virtue of its being part of an explanation of the circulatory system's
capacity to carry various solutes and cells around the organism, which is in turn a
part of an explanation of various other capacities of other parts of the organism, and so
on. Thus, having a certain biological function is clearly a relational property.
But are biological functions in my sense also holistic properties? Let us check if Esfeld's
two conditions are satisfied:
(1) Biological functions belong to a family of properties that make something a
constituent of an S in case there is a suitable arrangement.
(2) Nothing can instantiate a biological function unless there actually are other
things together with which this thing is arranged in such a way that there is
an S.
It will be readily appreciated that condition (2) is satisfied for biological functions if they
are construed in accordance with the coherence account. Here, "S" should be read as a
coherent system of capacities that stand in suitable contributory relations; its extension
will be a proper subset of all the capacities of an organism's parts. Any of these capacities
can only have a biological function by virtue of being part of such a coherent system.
Therefore, any biological function is generically ontologically dependent on other functions.
It is important to note that any part of an organism has its causal dispositions inde-
Annals of the History and Philosophy of Biology, Vol. 10 (2005)
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