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Unit 4—Handout 19<br />

Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary | Number 14<br />

“Thoughts on the Nanjing Massacre” Richard C. Bush III, from<br />

Professor Yang Daqing’s article “Atrocities in Nanjing, Searching for<br />

Explanations”<br />

. . . The fi rst explanation was that a breakdown in discipline, caused by supply shortages, led Japanese<br />

troops to engage in atrocities. But as reports accumulated of brutality in other parts of China, observers<br />

soon set aside the specifi c circumstances at Nanjing in late 1937 and came to a different and more general<br />

conclusion. That is, it was deliberate Japanese policy to strike terror into the hearts of Chinese. A third view<br />

was more social and cultural, captured in the term “militarism.” From this perspective, Japanese soldiers<br />

were products of a transitional society, neither traditional nor modern, and that the declining norms against<br />

violence that restrained them in Japan disappeared once they arrived in China.<br />

Among the factors George Washington University Professor Yang Daqing cites:<br />

• The Japanese Imperial Army had suffered a long-term decline of discipline. In the climate<br />

of more liberal trends in the 1920s Taisho period, offi cers responded by demanding absolute<br />

obedience of recruits through inhumane means. That in turn, it is argued, led to the need for<br />

those recruits to transfer aggression elsewhere. The poor Chinese were a convenient outlet<br />

once aggression in China began.<br />

• The offi cer corps was changing in a radical direction. Younger offi cers tended to have lived in<br />

military institutions from an early age. They often had links with ultra-nationalist groups. And<br />

they tended to disrespect civilian institutions.<br />

• The Japanese Army had a general contempt for the Chinese and had a lower standard for treatment<br />

of Chinese POWs as opposed to Western ones.<br />

• Due to the rapid expansion of the army in the summer of 1937, most of the troops sent to the<br />

Shanghai-Nanjing front were reservists. Their quality was relatively low and there was a high<br />

replacement rate due to heavy losses.<br />

• In their drive to carry out their orders to seize Nanjing, fi eld commanders overlooked the need<br />

to ensure adequate logistical preparation (particularly food), enough rest for troops, suffi cient<br />

military policeman to maintain order and to issue clear orders for the treatment of POWs<br />

and civilians.<br />

Yang concludes that all of these institutional factors, which refl ect an accumulation of poor decisions,<br />

contributed to the scale of the Nanjing atrocities. He also fi nds that battlefi eld psychology played an<br />

exacerbating role. Japanese soldiers had become terrifi ed during the heavier-than-expected losses in the battle<br />

for Shanghai. Revenging the death of fallen comrades was one response. Even according to the Imperial<br />

Army’s own rules of engagement, there were violations of discipline.<br />

Yang Daqing, “Atrocities in Nanjing, Searching for Explanations,” in Scars of War: The Impact of Warfare on<br />

Modern China. Vancouver: UBC P, 200. 76-96.<br />

Source: http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/12_nanjing_bush.aspx<br />

107

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